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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyze whether, and how, parallel legal tools can contribute to 
increasing non-state armed groups (NSAGs) compliance with international humanitarian 
law (IHL). The initial parts of this study highlight how the changing nature of warfare has 
brought forth a number of challenges to the framework of IHL. It is argued that while the 
international laws guiding conduct in war remains state-centered, the practical reality is 
less and less centered on the state. In following, it puts forth that enhancing NSAGs 
compliance with IHL is viewed as one of the core challenges to strengthen protection of 
civilians in armed conflict. It is suggested that the mechanisms for implementing IHL 
have failed to keep up with the changing nature of warfare, and that NSAGs must be 
addressed directly to strengthen respect for IHL in non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs). Thus, it is argued that of the instruments available, one of the most intriguing 
and innovative tools in the contemporary toolbox is the use of special agreements, or 
parallel legal tools on IHL.  
A literature analysis on three levels has been conducted. First, research on treaty 
effectiveness and legal agreements from the field of international human rights law 
(IHRL) has been utilized. Second, a general, and a specific, analysis of NSAGs and 
commitment to parallel legal tools on IHL is put forth to extract what the status is on the 
effectiveness of this instrument. Third, a combination of the latter two approaches, as 
well as research on NSAGs and engagement efforts, shows that the value of parallel legal 
tools is largely dependent upon group characteristics. Ultimately, this thesis does not 
suggest that parallel legal tools have the potential to end all violations of IHL committed 
by NSAGs. What it suggests, however, is that parallel legal tools do have the ability to 
strengthen compliance with IHL for NSAGs that inhabit certain characteristics. While 
this is not ideal, it would be a chimera that increased compliance with IHL by NSAGs 
could be achieved through a universal solution. In sum, it is argued that engagement 
efforts through parallel legal tools have practical utility because they address the gap 
between the practical reality and the legal reality.  
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Preface 
 
I first discovered my interest for international humanitarian law (IHL) when I became a 
volunteer for the Red Cross. Having learned little about this area of law during the course 
of my three years as a bachelor student in international studies, I was struck by the fact 
that the level of knowledge about this field was rather scarce, both among fellow students 
and among the general population whom I conversed with. Most seemed to believe that 
humanitarian law was the same as human rights law, and some where even surprised that 
the conduct of war is in fact regulated by laws. As a volunteer, I began to disseminate 
IHL to youth through creative and practical exercises that encourage debate and 
discussion. I was frequently asked, “what is the purpose of IHL, when in war, no one 
cares about the rules anyway”? Those that I spoke to were especially critical to its 
usefulness when it came to modern conflict, so called non-international armed conflicts 
or civil wars, because there was a general perception that the groups that carry out these 
armed struggles are not capable of, nor willing to, respect the applicable rules. In fact, 
many believed that a majority of armed groups violate IHL as a part of a deliberate 
strategy. It is intriguing to discover that though scholars, and legal experts, predominantly 
agree that IHL applies to non-state actors as well as state actors, the fact is that today, the 
vast number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that violate, or are accused of violating 
IHL stand completely outside the inter-state system. In the effort to protect civilians, and 
ensure respect for IHL in war, NSAGs are seldom engaged, spoken to, and asked to 
accept and commit to IHL. While the international system, and the international laws 
guiding conduct in war remains state-centred, the practical reality is less and less centred 
around the state, and the mechanisms to ensure that NSAGs respect IHL in their 
conduct, are still somewhat unexplored and innovative. This, in addition to my interest in 
the work of the Red Cross, has inspired the subject matter of this thesis.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic and background 
 
Throughout the last century, the conduct of warfare has changed dramatically. In its 
traditional sense, war has been waged between and against states. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, and in particular after the end of the Cold War, we have seen a 
dramatic increase in civil wars – wars fought between armed groups or wars fought 
between armed groups and the state.1 One of the prominent characteristics of intra-state 
war is addressed in a letter dated the 12th of November 2010 from the former General 
Secretary of the Norwegian Red Cross, Børge Brende, to the Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, stating that: “modern wars are characterised by armed 
groups presence on the battlefield”.2 Since World War II, the majority of armed conflicts 
in the world have not been international armed conflicts (IACs), but rather non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs),3 involving hostilities between government’s armed 
forces and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) or is carried out among members of such 
groups themselves.4 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the 
International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), there were 264 armed conflicts between 
2000 and 2007, of which 225 were internal in nature.5  
The changing nature of warfare described in the latter paragraph has brought forth a 
number of challenges to international humanitarian law (IHL), the body of law that seeks 
to regulate the conduct of hostilities and protect the victims of armed conflict. As argued 
by Bruderlein et al: “the ascendancy of NSAGs alongside state actors represents a core 
challenge in terms of international law, and in particular IHL and international human 
                                                
1 See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, also see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Stanford University Press, 1999, also 
see Michelle Mack, “Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts”, 
International Committee of the Red Cross Publication, Geneva, February, 2008 
2 Letter from the General Secretary’s of the Norwegian Red Cross’s office to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas 
Gahr Støre, 12th of November 2010 
3 Professor Norman Printer, Lecture at the 28th Warsaw Course on IHL, Warsaw, Poland,  July 6th, 2010.  
4 Mack, op. cit.  
5 UCDP and PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset referenced in Dawn Steinhoff, “Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy 
Concerns with Engaging Non-State Armed Groups”, in Texas International Law Journal 45 Tex. Int'l L. J. (2009-2010), 
p. 301  
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rights law (IHRL)”.6 On the 21st of September 2010, the President of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Dr. Jakob Kellenberger reflected upon the 
organisations most recent research study which was conducted with two main aims: 
identifying and understanding, more precisely and clearly, the humanitarian problems 
arising from armed conflict and devising possible legal solutions to them in terms of legal 
development or clarification.7 The study concludes that what is required to preserve 
human life and dignity during armed conflict is not the adoption of new rules, but rather 
to ensure greater compliance with the existing rules. It is stated that:  
Failure to comply with international humanitarian law, whether on the 
part of State armed forces or of non-governmental armed groups, is 
without doubt the main cause of suffering in armed conflicts. The major 
challenge of protecting victims in these situations thus consists of 
persuading, or even compelling, the parties concerned to comply with 
the rules by which they are bound.8  
 
Kellenberger’s reflections on failure to comply with IHL is illustrated by the unnerving 
brutality of modern warfare that we have witnessed in the course of the last few decades. 
Deliberate targeting of civilians, the forced displacement of populations, the use of 
civilians as human shields, the destruction of infrastructure vital to civilian populations, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture and indiscriminate attacks are all acts of 
violence that occur frequently in the context of NIACs.9  These violations, as pointed out 
by Kellenberger, cannot be ascribed in full to either the State armed forces or NSAGs. 
According to Olivier Bangerter, ICRC advisor for the Dialogue with Armed Groups, 
where reasonably accurate figures are available, they do not support the allegation that 
armed groups commit the most, or the most gruesome violations. On the contrary, they 
reveal that there is no fixed pattern.10 We could therefore argue that both states and 
                                                
6 Claude Bruderlein, Andrew Clapham, Keith Krause and Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Transnational 
and Non-State Actors: Issues and Challenges”, Concept Note, Prepared for Seminar on Transnational and Non-State 
Armed Groups convened by the Program of Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University in 
cooperation with the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced 
Study at Harvard University, Cambridge, March 9-10, 2007 (hereinafter Bruderlein et.al)  
6 Steinhoff, op. cit., p. 298 
7 Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, “Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts”, in International Review of 
the Red Cross, Volume 92, Number 879, September 2010, p. 799  
8 International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft resolution and Report for the 31st International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, Strengthening Legal Protection for victims of armed conflicts, October 2001, Geneva, p. 13 
9 Mack, op. cit., p. 5 
10 Olivier Bangerter, "Measures armed groups can take to improve respect for IHL", in "Non-State Actors and International 
Humanitarian Law, Organized armed groups: a challenge for the 21st century", proceedings of the 32nd roundtable 
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NSAGs violate IHL. I argue that what is interesting about these violations is not the fact 
that they are committed by both state and non-state entities, but rather, that despite the 
overwhelming number of NSAGs that operate at present, and the frequent reminders that 
NSAGs do participate in a majority of the conflicts that we see unfolding, there is still, as 
Mary Foster argues, an “overwhelming focus on the state in dominant discourses and 
institutions of global relations”.11 Foster made this statement in 2000, and one can argue 
that almost 12 years later, it is still the case that “efforts to protect civilians in situations of 
armed conflict must address not only the behaviour of States, but also that of NSAGs”.12 
Further highlighting not only the relevance, but also the importance of the issue of 
compliance is the fact that a 2009 United Nations Report of the Secretary-General points 
to enhancing NSAGs compliance with IHL as one of “the core five challenges” to 
strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict.13 Again highlighting the ever-
present nature of this issue is the fact that at current, the Norwegian Red Cross is 
encouraging the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to play an important role in dialogue with 
armed groups about strengthened respect for IHL on the battlefield. 
Four years before the previously mentioned ICRC study was concluded, David P. 
Forsythe argued that “never before in world history have civilians constituted such a high 
percentage of the casualties in armed conflicts. But never have there been so many rules 
and actors trying to humanize war”.14 Forsythe’s passage illustrates the clear paradox 
between existing law and the existing non-compliance with the law. Following what 
Forsythe pointed out in 2006 one could arguably make the case that the problem lays not 
in the lack of law, but rather in the lack of compliance with the law. This argument, 
combined with the previously highlighted statement by Foster, sets the platform for the 
very core of this thesis, namely how one can effectively work to increase NSAGs respect, 
and subsequent compliance with the IHL. It is from this contention that I will move on 
to explaining the objectives of this thesis and the research question.   
                                                                                                                                                   
on current issues, 11-13 September 2009, International Institute of Humanitarian Law - San Remo & Franco Angeli, 
2010, p. 190 
11 Mary Foster, in “Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban”, Full Conference Proceedings, Geneva 24th and 25th of 
March 2000, accessible through http://www.genevacall.org/resources/conference-reports/f-conference-
reports/pre/gc-2000-24mar-geneva.pdf  
12 Geneva Call, About us, http://www.genevacall.org/about/about.htm, consulted 15th of February, 2011 
13 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/2009/277, 29 May 2009, paras. 38-47. 
14 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 85 
13 
 
1.2 Objectives and research question 
 
The respect for IHL in NIACs needs to be strengthened because parties often evade 
humanitarian regulation of their conduct. As pointed out in the latter section, both states 
and NSAGs frequently fail to comply with IHL. However, while state actors, as parties to 
the Geneva Conventions, are bound by Common Article 315 in addition to other 
applicable conventional and customary norms, the theory under which non-state actors 
are bound is a bit more problematic. After all, NSAGs cannot become parties to treaties 
and cannot contribute to the creation of customary law. Despite this, there seems to be 
consensus among scholars on the applicability of IHL to NSAGs. Though undeniably 
interrelated, as will be discussed in a later section, one can argue that the issue then seems 
to be one of compliance, rather than applicability. In this regard, Claude Bruderlein brings 
forth an important point. He argues that IHL and human rights standards offer only 
limited opportunities to persuade armed groups to comply, whereas a collection of legal 
instruments have been developed to supply state actors with a comprehensive framework, 
guiding the conduct of their combatants.16 Thus, as briefly mentioned earlier, and as 
argued in a report by the Program of Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) 
at Harvard University and the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) “the rise 
of non-state armed groups in the post-Cold War period raises legal challenges in terms of 
how to deal with these entities using IHL and international human rights law (IHRL)”.17 
In the realization that these challenges are not easily solved, scholars and practitioners 
have explored, proposed and utilized a variety of tools in the effort to increase NSAGs 
respect for IHL.18 In recent years, much focus has been directed towards the argument 
that to hold NSAGs responsible for violations of IHL, “they have to be assigned 
responsibility for ending them”, and according to David Capie and Pablo Policzer “for 
this to happen, groups have to be addressed directly”.19 The idea to engage with NSAGs 
                                                
15 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 
16 Claude Bruderlein, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security - The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State 
Wars, Human Security Network, Geneva, 2000, p. 6 
17 Report by HPCR and HEI, op. cit., p. 14 
18 The various ‘tools’ are elaborated further in section 4.3 
19 David Capie and Pablo Policzer, “Keeping the Promise of Protection: Holding armed groups to the same standard 
as states”, Working Paper 3, Armed Groups Project, January 2004, p. 2 
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in order to increase their respect for IHL and to assist them in this regard has become 
increasingly accepted.20 Out of this conception, an idea, and a practice, of agreements that 
are functionally, as opposed to legally, equivalent to the Geneva Conventions has grown 
to develop. I will hereinafter refer to the functional equivalent as ‘parallel legal 
agreements’ or ‘parallel legal tools’. In light of this, and due to the necessity of a narrowed 
focus, we shall limit the scope of this paper by asking the following research question:  
Can parallel legal tools contribute to increasing non-state armed groups 
compliance with international humanitarian law? If so, how? 
In order to answer the stated question, I find it necessary to begin by clarifying the 
framework and the important concepts that lie beneath the research question. 
Subsequently, I investigate different perspectives on violations of IHL, and explore a 
variety of suggestions as to how compliance with IHL can be strengthened. I argue that 
of all the instruments available, one of the most intriguing and innovative tools in the 
contemporary toolbox is the use of special agreements, or parallel legal tools. In order to 
assess whether, and how, parallel legal tools can contribute to increasing NSAGs 
compliance with IHL, I will conduct a literature analysis on three levels. First of all, I will 
draw upon research on treaty effectiveness and legal agreements from the field of IHRL, 
and secondly, I will present a general, and a specific, analysis of NSAGs and parallel legal 
tools to extract what the status is on the effectiveness of this instrument. The third 
approach will build upon some of the elements from the first two approaches and argue 
that the value of parallel legal tools is largely dependent upon group characteristics. The 
research question will thus be answered through a threefold approach, with the aim of 
acquiring empirical knowledge on the value of parallel legal tools for NSAGs.  
1.3 Justification of topic  
 
Political science and international law are interdependent subjects, and several political 
science studies examine the role of international law in current international relations. 
                                                
20 Marco Sassóli, “Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law”, in International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1, 2010, p. 10  
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However, there has been an overwhelming focus on jus ad bellum, the legality of waging 
war in political science. Jus in bello, the laws in war, or IHL, have not been given as much 
attention within the same field. In addition, when it comes to the various branches of 
international law, one could argue that IHRL as a subject matter has overshadowed IHL 
within the field of political science. Thus, much of the academic literature on IHL has 
been conducted by scholars of law within the field of law, with the purpose of addressing 
strictly judicial questions of application and enforcement.  
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the increasing role of non-state armed groups in 
modern conflicts highlights the need for further research. Apart from the existing gap 
linking political science and IHL, it is particularly important that the main justification for 
addressing this particular area of international law is because there is a great need to 
strengthen respect for IHL in NIACs. As argued by Mack: “where IHL is not respected, 
human suffering increases and the consequences of the conflict become more difficult to 
repair”.21 In addition, those waging war are using techniques or strategies that are causing 
superfluous damage to combatants, civilian populations and infrastructure. Though both 
state and non-state actors commit these violations, it is particularly important to address 
the violations committed by NSAGs, as the methods and instruments to address these 
actors are highly undeveloped. As Marco Sassóli points out, “international law is mainly 
made by states; it is mainly addressed to states; its implementation mechanisms are mainly 
state centred”, but yet, “the international reality is, however, less and less state-centred”.22 
The subject matter of this paper is thus justified by a critical need to tackle the emerging 
role of NSAGs in modern conflicts, and furthermore, because it is crucial to look into the 
potential of instruments that may possibly increase NSAGs respect for IHL. A number of 
scholars and practitioners as well as international organisations such as the ICRC and the 
United Nations have highlighted the importance of developing new insight into how one 
can achieve compliance with IHL in NIACs, and especially how one can strengthen 
NSAGs respect for IHL.  
                                                
21 Mack, op. cit., p. 5 
22 Sassóli, op. cit., p. 10  
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1.4 Structure  
 
Before moving on to methodology, I will provide a short overview of the structure of this 
paper, as well as the main purpose of each chapter. First of all, the purpose of this paper 
is to analyze whether parallel legal tools can increase non-state armed groups compliance 
with IHL applicable in NIACs. The second objective of this paper is to discuss how it can 
lead to compliance, and for who parallel legal tools have potential value.  
Chapter two will put forth how this thesis will attempt to answer the stated research 
question, discuss the challenges related to the cross-disciplinary nature of the area of 
research, reflect upon the use of sources, put forth some methodological concerns and 
make a note on the issues of validity and reliability.  
Chapter three will introduce important frameworks and concepts related to the subject 
matter of this thesis. The body of law known as IHL will be properly introduced, and the 
debate on its applicability to NSAGs will be put forth. It will be argued that though there 
is an existing debate on IHLs applicability to NSAGs, the bottom line – legally - is that 
once an armed conflict breaks out between a state party and a non-state party, both 
parties are obliged to comply with IHL in whole or part. Before moving on, it is critical to 
the validity of this thesis to map out what exactly the NSAG concept entails. NSAGs are 
not a homogenous group, they differ in size, motivation, strategy, and it is difficult to 
ascribe a concrete definition of what constitutes an NSAG. Therefore, it is necessary to 
reflect upon the debate on the concept in itself and outline some of the main 
observations that have been made in dealing with this multifarious concept. In following, 
I will move on to explore the concept of parallel legal tools. I will put forth what they are, 
and more importantly, why they are, as well as explain how they are utilized and what 
purpose they are thought to serve. It will be argued that parallel legal tools may be used as 
substitute agreements because states have legitimacy concerns with engaging armed 
groups, and are unwilling to include NSAGs in international legal agreements that 
regulate warfare. Thus, its function comes not from changing the content of a group’s 
legal obligation, but rather, from putting in place genuine commitment to the rules. The 
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main argument is based upon Olivier Bangerter’s notion that parallel agreements “create 
accepted standards, instead of what is often considered as imposed standards”.23  
Chapter four will put forth various explanations for why IHL is violated, and examine 
different approaches to how increased compliance with IHL can be achieved. This 
chapter will suggest that one of the most modern, appropriate and intriguing tools in the 
contemporary toolbox is the use of parallel legal tools, or special agreements for NSAGs 
on IHL. It will be argued that there is a clear discrepancy in the fact that modern wars are 
fought within, rather than between, states, and the fact that the legal framework that seeks 
to regulate conflict is built by, and centred on the state. In order to challenge this state-
centric framework, parallel legal tools have been utilized to include NSAGs in the IHL 
equation without jeopardizing the sovereignty of the state as a powerful and law-making 
entity. The purpose of chapter four is thus to justify the focus on parallel legal tools, and 
create a platform from which one can move on to discuss how the tool itself can 
contribute to increasing NSAGs respect for IHL.  
Chapter five takes on a threefold approach to explore how parallel legal tools may 
facilitate compliance. The first approach discusses the contention that legal agreements 
have the ability to facilitate compliance and is based on research from IHRL on treaty 
effectiveness. The second approach examines the idea that ownership of the law, or 
commitment to the law, is vital in generating rule-consistent behaviour. First, I will 
present general perspectives on ownership, and secondly, I will move on to a more case 
specific example and discuss how the tool has been utilized in practice by the 
humanitarian organization Geneva Call’s and its efforts since 2000 to engage NSAGs in a 
landmine ban, also known as The Deed of Commitment. The third approach will build 
upon the theoretical work of Beth Simmons on typologies, and bring in central elements 
from literature on groups characteristics as a decisive factor in the success or failure of 
engagement with NSAGs. The main purpose of discussing this approach is to establish 
that there is no cure all when dealing with NSAGs and IHL.  
                                                
23 Bangerter, op. cit., p. 196  
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Chapter six will put forth concluding remarks; provide an answer to the research 
question, state what contributions this thesis has made to research, and at last, make some 
suggestions towards future research.  
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2 Methodology  
 
This thesis seeks to investigate whether parallel legal tools can lead to increased respect 
for IHL by NSAGs, and through a threefold approach, explore how and for whom this 
tool can facilitate compliance. Firstly, this requires an understanding of what IHL is, and 
whom it applies to. To appreciate why parallel legal tools are suggested as a way to 
increase NSAGs respect for IHL, one must also have insight into the debate on 
application of IHL to NSAGs, as well as an understanding of how the state centric nature 
of IHL is of hindrance to NSAGs. As the question speaks of NSAGs and parallel legal 
tools, any attempt to provide an answer would fail without an understanding of the two 
concepts. Furthermore, without exploring how violations can be explained, and the 
various suggestions to increase compliance, the focus on parallel legal tools would seem 
naïve.  
The main methodological question is; how will I proceed to answer the stated research 
question? Field research on NSAGs and compliance with IHL is arguably difficult. Due 
to the difficulty, and danger, of gathering a representative selection of leaders or members 
of NSAGs, this thesis cannot rely on own interviews and field data. If it were possible, 
and if safety could be guaranteed, meeting with a selection of NSAGs to ask them their 
perspectives on application, commitment and compliance with IHL would have been 
intriguing. However, due to the considerations associated with such a task, the possibility 
of conducting interviews with former members of NSAGs that are currently living in 
Norway was contemplated. Former work at the Embassy of Sri Lanka, and contacts 
gained through this experience would perhaps have made this possible. Yet, this method 
is not executable for two main reasons; first, they are difficult to locate and second, they 
are not willing to talk. Furthermore, a distributed questionnaire, if possible, would hardly 
provide me the insight required to answer the research question. Therefore, in order to 
answer the stated research question, I will collect, compare and analyse existing literature 
and conduct a literature analysis on three different levels. First, I will draw upon research 
on treaty effectiveness and legal agreements from the field of IHRL, and second, I will 
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use what is already established about NSAGs and parallel legal tools to conduct a general 
and a specific analysis on the status of this instrument. Third, I will combine elements 
from the two first approaches, as well as previously conducted research into the role 
played by group characteristics in engagement efforts, to arrive at an answer to the 
question posed. The research question will thus be answered through a threefold 
approach to the literature, with the aim of acquiring empirical knowledge on the value of 
parallel legal tools for NSAGs.  
2.1 Methodological concerns 
 
First of all, because the subject matter of this paper falls in the purview of both law and 
political science, it becomes crucial to make sure that all concepts and terms are clearly 
defined and understandable to both a political scientists and a lawyer. This is particularly 
challenging when it comes to the IHL, because as stated previously, the general 
knowledge of IHL is rather scarce within the field of political science. To address this 
concern, and to accommodate the combination of both disciplines, a thorough 
introduction to IHL and the debate on applicability to NSAGs will be given in chapter 
three.  
The terms parallel legal tools and non-state armed groups are particularly important to an 
understanding of this thesis, and therefore, I have dedicated a section in chapter three to 
reflect upon the use of terminology. It will however be shown that a clear definition of 
non-state armed groups is not viable, nor productive.  
2.2 Cross-disciplinary challenges 
 
The subject matter of this thesis, international humanitarian law, is typically dissected and 
discussed as a part of legal studies. A quick search through the archive of digital 
publications at the University of Oslo revealed that no former student in political science 
had focused on IHL as a part of their thesis. This realization served as motivation, rather 
than distress. In the study of political science, one is taught of independence and state 
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sovereignty, but at the same time, one is made aware of how exceptional situations can 
require the international community to violate the sovereignty of a state. The field of 
international law is therefore arguably somewhat contradictory to the deep-seated 
principle of state sovereignty within political science; because international law by its very 
definition requires states to surrender some of their autonomy to the international 
community. Researching international humanitarian law within a political science 
framework may therefore prove to be challenging. Instead of having a rigid framework 
based on either the one or the other discipline, one may find it useful to employ the parts 
of each discipline that can prove beneficial to the understanding the subject matter of this 
thesis.  
A few years back, a number of scholars asked: “in a decade when questions of 
restructuring world order dominated, why has international law not figured in the search 
for answers?”24 According to the authors, between 1990 and 1999, only one lead article 
on international law was published in the American Political Science Review, and less 
than ten percent of the articles published in the International Studies Quarterly were on a 
subject related to international law.25 It is argued that despite the differences between the 
two fields of international law and political science, both political scientists and lawyers 
can benefit from greater familiarity with the work of the other. However, as I take on the 
task of cross-disciplinary research, it is important to keep in mind that goals influence the 
methods of social scientists and lawyers, and their goals differ, as pointed out by Ku et 
al.26 It is argued that lawyers are more prescriptive than social scientists, and also, that the 
main goal or interest is to change behaviour. On the other hand, social scientists seek to 
understand behaviour but not necessarily change it.27 The purpose of this thesis is 
consistent with both disciplines. First, it seeks to understand why NSAGs are not 
fulfilling their obligations to IHL to the best of their ability, and furthermore, it explores 
how violations of IHL by NSAGs can be reduced, and suggests how parallel legal tools 
can contribute to the latter.  
                                                
24 Charlotte Ku et al., “Exploring International Law: Opportunities and Challenges for Political Science Research”, in 
International Studies Review, Vol. 3, Issue 1, p. 3  
25 ibid.  
26 ibid. p. 22 
27 ibid. p. 22 
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2.3 Sources  
 
As mentioned, if time, resources, and access to NSAGs were not problematic, nor 
dangerous, this study would have benefited from in-depth interviews with the leadership 
of some of the NSAGs that have committed to IHL through parallel legal tools. Instead, I 
have met, spoken to and benefited from the advice and the insight of Dr. Olivier 
Bangerter, who has been working for the ICRC for ten years, and who has met, engaged 
and spoken to a number of NSAGs about IHL on several occasions throughout his 
career. In addition to meeting him at a conference arranged by the ICRC in Warsaw, 
Poland, I have exchanged e-mails with Dr. Bangerter, and made great use of his written 
academic work on IHL application to NSAGs.  
In addition, I have made a conscious choice to draw upon much of the literature written 
within the field of IHRL, particularly on the matter of commitment and compliance. 
Therefore, one will find that parts of the discussion in chapter five are based upon work 
by some of the most prominent scholars within the field of IHRL. Although IHRL and 
IHL are different branches of law, they are closely related as they share a common basis 
of fundamental concern for humanity, and sets out mechanism that serve to protect 
people in vulnerable situations. IHRL and IHL are reconciling distinct, yet increasingly 
convergent legal regimes that are applicable in situations of violence.28 The main 
difference between IHRL and IHL is that the obligations in IHRL applies to the state in 
both peace and war, with some obligations being derogable in situations of public 
emergency, while the obligations in IHL apply to both state and non-state parties once a 
war has broken out.29 The threshold of violence and the pronouncement of a state of war 
will be discussed further in a later section. The convergence between the two bodies of 
law is particularly present in the debate of parallel application, the principle of lex specialis, 
which is the idea that when multiple bodies of law regulate a single event, one uses the 
                                                
28 Naz Modirzadeh, Associate Director at the International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research (HPCR), Lecture at the 28th Warsaw Course on IHL, Warsaw, Poland, July 4th, 2010 
29 ibid.  
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body of law that is most specifically tailored to the situation at hand.30 The principle of lex 
specialis is interesting, however, further elaboration will not be provided because it would 
require a judicial and legal focus. However, as some of the most comprehensive studies 
on the effect of treaties and legal agreements have been conducted within the field of 
IHRL, one may find that IHRL can enrich the study of IHL and contribute to a better 
understanding of the field.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to note that some of the material used in this thesis comes 
from the ICRC, or people working for the ICRC or National Societies of the Red Cross. 
Two of the main guiding principles of the Red Cross are neutrality and impartiality; 
however, the fact that this organisation is impartial and neutral towards the parties in 
conflict does not mean that they are not inclined to further their own interests. However, 
the extensive use of sources published and written by other humanitarian organisations, 
as well as scholars not associated with the Red Cross in any way makes this a minor 
concern.  
2.4 Validity and reliability 
 
As outlined in the latter sections, this thesis conducts a qualitative analysis of literature 
and previously conducted research within the area of IHRL and IHL to answer the 
research question. Alan Bryman points out that “qualitative research is a research strategy 
that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data”.31 Manheim et al. argue that:   
Quantitative researchers are usually able to employ some well-established 
rules of analysis in deciding what is valid evidence for or against their 
theory. These include such tools as measures of statistical significance 
and statistical tests of validity, as well as formal logic. Qualitative 
researchers generally lack this type of commonly agreed to and 
‘objective’ tool. Rather, they must rely on their ability to present a clear 
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31Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 366 
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description, offer a convincing analysis, and make a strong argument for 
their interpretation to establish the value of their conclusions.32  
As demonstrated by the latter quote, the measures available to the quantitative researcher 
to ensure reliability and validity are thus not as easily available to the qualitative 
researcher, and therefore, a qualitative study is arguably not entirely objective. The choices 
made when collecting information, and the choices made when interpreting the gathered 
information, influence the findings. Consequently, the validity and reliability of this thesis 
is largely dependent upon the previously conducted research, the choice of sources, and 
the interpretation of these sources. To accommodate this, the research conducted to 
answer the stated research question has remained within an objective framework by 
gathering sources from a broad range of institution, scholars and organizations. An 
important aspect of ensuring that the two criteria are fulfilled in this thesis is the use of 
clearly defined concepts and frameworks, and therefore, it is important that the reader is 
fully informed of how the concepts are used and what they entail. In addition, adopting a 
cross-disciplinary approach to the subject matter increases validity, because it broadens 
the researchers framework and does not allow for a rigid interpretation of the material. 
Also, alternative explanations are explored to increase the validity of the findings in this 
thesis.  
On the other hand, judging qualitative research on the basis of the same criteria as 
quantitative research is by some researches argued to be inappropriate.33 Guba and 
Lincoln argue that instead of assessing qualitative research according to validity and 
reliability, it is more useful to assess it according to trustworthiness and authenticity.34 
One of the reasons why Lincoln and Guba suggest an alternative assessment of qualitative 
studies is that the criteria of reliability and validity presuppose that a single absolute 
account of social reality is feasible.35 As such, it is arguably inappropriate to assume that 
the findings and conclusions made in this thesis constitute a single absolute.  
 
                                                
32 Jarol B. Manheim, Richard C. Rich and Lars Willnat (editors), Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods 
in Political Science, 2002, 5th edition, Toronto, Longman, p. 317 
33 Bryman, op. cit., p. 377 
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3 Clarification of framework and concepts  
 
In chapter three, I will first present the framework of international humanitarian law and 
review the current debate about its application to non-state actors. In continuation, I will 
present the concept of NSAGs and explain why scholars and practitioners have failed to 
agree upon a concrete definition of this complex concept. Furthermore, I will briefly 
explain the concept of parallel legal tools, and refer to some relevant examples.  
3.1 The law applicable in armed conflict  
 
The body of law that seeks to regulate the conduct of hostilities and protect the victims of 
armed conflict is what we know as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and consists of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the two Additional Protocols from 1977 and customary 
international law. As stated in chapter one, the majority of armed conflicts since the end 
of World War II have been NIACs, yet, only one article from the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions speaks to such conflicts. This article, known as common Article 3 (CA 3)36, 
in addition to customary international law37 and Additional Protocol II (AP II)38, form the 
                                                
36 Common Article 3 is listed in all four Geneva Conventions and speaks to conflicts not of an international 
character. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms 
and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or 
any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
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Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding 
provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
37 International law comes from both treaty law and rules of what is known as customary international law. Treaties 
are written conventions in which States formally establish certain rules. Customary international law, on the other 
hand, is not written but derives from "a general practice accepted as law". To prove that a certain rule is customary, 
one has to show that it is reflected in state practice and that the international community believes that such practice 
is required as a matter of law (International Committee of the Red Cross, “Customary International Law”, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/overview-customary-law.htm) 
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corpus of IHL that governs NIACs.39 Currently, this legal framework is faced with a 
number of difficult challenges as a result of the proliferation of non-international armed 
conflicts: i) protection of persons deprived of liberty, ii) measures for implementing 
international humanitarian law and the reparation of violations, iii) the protection of the 
natural environment and iv) protection of internally displaced persons.40 Apart from these 
four challenges, it is widely recognized that one of the most critical challenges to IHL is 
caused by the increased presence of NSAGs on the battlefield. A report released by the 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research in 2007 supports Luc Reydams 
argument that “IHL currently faces challenges resulting from the emergence of 
transnational terrorist networks and criminal organizations, an aspiring hegemony’s 
militarization of its foreign and counter-terrorism policies, the privatization of traditional 
military activities, and the near collapse of some states”.41  
While state actors, as parties to the Geneva Conventions, AP I and AP II, are bound by 
the rules stipulated in these documents, the application of IHL in NIACs, and the theory 
under which NSAGs are bound is a bit more problematic.42 Interestingly enough, despite 
the fact that NSAGs cannot become parties to treaties, and cannot contribute to the 
creation of customary law, the prevailing opinion is that non-state actors are bound by 
IHL under one or both of the following theories. First of all, as citizens of states that are 
bound by IHL, it follows that NSAGs who engage in armed conflict are also bound by 
IHL. Secondly, a NSAG that undertakes violence that rises to the level of armed conflict 
is legally bound by the rules applicable to internal conflicts.43  
However, there are far less rules regulating the conduct of hostilities in NIACs than there 
is in IACs, and one may ask why different rules exists depending on whether the conflict 
is internal or international in character. It is perhaps puzzling that different laws should 
                                                                                                                                                   
38 AP II is a 1977 amendment protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflicts. It defines certain international laws that strive to provide better protection for victims 
of internal armed conflicts that take place within the borders of a single country.  
39 Printer, op. cit.  
40 Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, “Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts”, in International Review of 
the Red Cross, Volume 92, Number 879, September 2010, p. 799  
41 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Geneva, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and Policy Options: the Challenges of Transnational and Non-
State Armed Groups”, November 2007, p. 30 
42 Printer, op. cit.  
43 ibid.   
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guide behaviour depending on the legal character of the conflict, because after all, for the 
people affected by the conflict, its brutality does not depend on its legal characterisation. 
Nevertheless, according to Professor Norman Printer, there are three explanations for the 
disproportioned relationship between the two. The first is historical, and is grounded in 
the fact that matters internal to a state were not an appropriate subject of international 
law. Secondly, the notion of state sovereignty has made states reluctant to allow the 
international community to involve itself in matters that are generally considered to be 
domestic in nature, such as internal violence.44 Lastly, Printer argues that the third 
consideration is legal in nature. Both domestic law and applicable human rights law 
continues to apply during an internal conflict, and this has lessened the need for the 
international community to regulate internal conflict.45  
Previously, it was suggested that the problem regarding IHL in NIACs seems to be one of 
compliance rather than applicability. This however, is an easily contended argument, as 
many would assert that applicability and compliance are undeniably connected, and 
uncertainty around applicability of IHL in NIACs could lead to a lack of compliance. We 
shall therefore reflect upon the issue of applicability in the next section.   
3.2 The issue of applicability  
 
The first step in determining the applicable law is characterising an armed conflict as 
international or non-international, and due to the disproportionate relationship between 
treaty law in NIACs and IACs, this distinction remains highly relevant.46 Perhaps the 
largest distinction between the two is the fact that in an internal armed conflict, the only 
legitimate forces are those of the state, and therefore, there is no entitlement to 
combatant or prisoner-of-war status in NIACs.47 The application of Article 1.2 in AP II 
states the Protocol shall not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as 
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not being armed conflicts”48, thus, the existence of an armed conflict is necessary for its 
application. Firstly, this indicates that the violence must reach a certain threshold, and 
secondly, one can argue that it is a precondition that belligerency, usually in the form of 
an identified and organized armed group, exists. Concerning the first condition however, 
it is necessary to mention that there exists a continuous debate on where the application 
of IHL begins and ends in modern conflicts, and different views exist when it comes to 
the matter of a threshold of violence. In inter-state wars, a declaration of a state of war 
would trigger the application of IHL, however it is no longer the case that a declaration of 
war creates the de jure fact of war.49 The second condition is addressed in Article 1.1 in AP 
II, stating that it “shall apply to all armed conflicts (…) which take place in the territory of 
a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol”.50 What Article 1.1 addresses is particularly 
relevant considering the complex nature of the various NSAGs that operate at present. 
Therefore, I will return to a more detailed discussion of the concept of NSAGs.  
Though the two conditions set out in the latter paragraph are quite clear, the 
determination of whether a situation constitutes an armed conflict or not remains 
difficult. The fact of the matter is that there is no authoritative body at the international 
level that can pronounce on the legal status of an armed conflict, and therefore, such 
pronouncements are in practice undertaken by States, international organisations, non-
governmental organisations, the ICRC, courts, scholars and others.51 According to Pejic, 
determining the existence of an armed conflict is particularly sensitive in situations of 
NIAC, because State parties will often deny that the threshold of violence has been 
reached, allowing them to characterise its actions as ‘law enforcement’ or ‘counter-
                                                
48 AP II, Article 1.2.  
49 See for example Mary Ellen O’Connor, “Defining Armed Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Security Law, Vol. 13, pp. 
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terrorist’ operations.52 Political considerations will most particularly come into play in 
situations of internal violence, as states have traditionally been hesitant to allow the 
application of IHL for fear of acknowledging that their opponents should be treated as a 
party to the conflict.53 It is for this specific reason that CA 3 explicitly says that “the 
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to 
the conflict”54, which essentially means that recognizing application of CA 3 to a non-
state party does not proscribe legitimacy to said party.  
Despite the continuous debate on IHL application to NSAGs, as referred to by Andrew 
Clapham, in 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court held that “it is 
well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are 
bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to 
international treaties”.55 Clapham claims that “it has now become uncontroversial, even 
commonplace, to refer to non-state parties to an armed conflict being bound by 
international humanitarian law”, but argues that though this is a “well settled” conclusion, 
the legal reasoning remains unclear.56 Clapham proceeds his inquiry into why NSAGs 
should be considered bound by examining the various aspects of the legal framework, 
namely i) the law of treaties, ii) contemporary customary international law, iii) rebellion, 
sedition, insurrection, civil war and belligerency and iv) special agreements, unilateral 
declarations and codes of conduct. Having mapped out the various aspects, he addresses 
when exactly these obligations will be valid to the group in question and concludes with 
what was briefly mentioned in a previous section, namely the preconditions for the 
application of IHL, violence threshold and organizational requirements.57   
For the validity of this thesis, the debate on the applicability of IHL to NSAGs is worth 
mentioning. However, from a legal point of view, the bottom line is that when it can be 
asserted that an internal armed conflict has erupted between an organized non-state actor 
and a state, both parties are bound by a minimum of applicable rules. As argued by 
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Michelle Mack, “the extensive practice of international courts and tribunals and other 
international bodies affirms this obligation”.58 However, being able to effectively show 
that the law applies, does not ensure respect for the law, or compliance with the law for 
that matter. Legal or rational reasoning may be efficient academically, but insufficient in 
practical terms.  
3.3 Non-state armed groups 
 
In order to have an understanding of the concept of NSAGs, this section will deal with 
the complexities of the concept, and provide a backdrop to the approach that will be dealt 
with in chapter five. At the end of this section, I will argue that the complex nature of the 
concept of NSAGs has two consequences related to the subject matter of this thesis.   
Some have described NSAGs as armed organizations independent of state control that 
use violence to achieve political ends, while others adopt a broader definition and argues 
that NSAGs are challengers to the states monopoly of legitimate coercive force.59 It was 
mentioned in the introductory phase of this paper that one of the main characteristics of 
modern warfare is the presence of armed groups on the battlefield. While during the Cold 
War the international community focused on inter-state war, today it increasingly 
recognizes that most conflicts are civil wars fought between states and non-state actors, 
according to Capie and Policzer.60 In following, they argue that “today these rebel groups, 
militias, warlords, and insurgents seriously threaten not just the security of states, but the 
most basic human rights of millions of people”.61 In “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, 
and Policy Options”, the authors attribute the rise of NSAGs to three post-Cold War 
trends. First, it can be attributed to the violent struggles by non-state actors that have 
resulted in the increased fragmentation of states into smaller self-governing entities.62 
Secondly, privatization of warfare and the introduction of many new private security and 
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military actors into an increasingly complex international political environment and 
thirdly, due to the expansion of global communications networks, states have become 
more accountable for their acts towards non-state actors.63 Bruderlein et al. highlights the 
necessity of outlining the current and future nature of armed conflict to draw out the 
implications of and strategies for engaging transnational and non-state armed groups, in a 
diverse range of conflict contexts.64 The reasoning related to why and how these groups 
have come to dominate the current landscape of warfare are worthy of note, however, 
what is perhaps more relevant for the validity of this thesis is; who and what are they? 
Therefore, before we can proceed, it is necessary to deal with these specific questions, and 
address the complexity of this concept.  
First of all, NSAGs are not a homogenous group, and any attempt to provide a single, 
universal definition is likely to fail. Claude Bruderlein argues that: “as armed groups differ 
considerably, from Mafia-like militias to religious movements to corporate armies, 
common descriptions should not be elaborated too specifically”.65 Secondly, as the 
purpose of this thesis is to examine a tool that requires engagement with NSAGs, it is 
important to point out that most practitioners agree that the main characteristics of armed 
groups should be identified prior to engagement.66 By doing so, one may detect minimum 
organizational standards that would make contact worthwhile.67 In “The Roots of 
Behaviour in War”, Munoz-Rojac and Frésard argue that: “humanitarian organizations 
would do well to remove the term ‘destructured conflict’ from their vocabulary – or at 
least not abuse the term – and to explore whatever avenues would allow them to know 
the groups better and approach them more effectively”.68  
As stated by Pablo Policzer, “while non-state armed groups have always existed, to this 
day there is no clear consensus on how to describe or define them, or on what should be 
expected from them”.69 He argues that the confusion regarding this concept is the result 
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of two unresolved debates. The first unresolved debate is the product of the insurgencies 
and the counterinsurgencies of the Cold War and the end of colonialism, and concerns 
the portrayal of given groups or individuals as either “terrorists” or “freedom fighters”.70 
Policzer alleges that the remaining validity of the phrase “one person’s terrorist is another 
person’s freedom fighter” is a simple recognition that this debate remains unsolved.71 The 
second unresolved issue is attributed to the beginning of the 1970s, where a series of 
debates took place inside the humanitarian and human rights communities over how to 
deal with acts of violence committed by NSAGs. Policzer argues that because 
humanitarian and human rights norms were traditionally understood to apply only to the 
state, there were difficulties concerning whether groups characterised as terrorists, 
liberation movements, militias or freedom fighters, should be expected to respect the 
same norms.72 Printer has contended that within the traditional framework, NSAGs were 
simply a domestic political or criminal problem, and their behaviour was not an 
appropriate subject matter for international law.73 However, as pointed out in a previous 
section of this thesis, and as affirmed by Policzer, this traditional paradigm began to 
change in the 1970s, and it is now clear that “if humanitarian and human rights standards 
are to have any validity, they should apply to all relevant actors, not simply states”.74  
Nevertheless, while the debate on whether humanitarian and human rights norms should 
apply to all relevant actors has been relatively settled, there is remaining uncertainty 
regarding how to describe or define NSAGs. This uncertainty can partly be attributed to 
the changing nature of NSAGs throughout the last few decades. As argued by Bruderlein 
et al.:  
as compared to the role of [NSAGs] in previous decades, during which 
the armed groups were essentially using military force as an alternative 
means to democratic change to achieve political goals, most 
contemporary [NSAGs] are no longer modelled on political resistance 
movements whose modus operandi was primarily domestic and aimed at 
national liberation. In many instances, the new groups represent 
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ambitious political actors who already benefit from a significant level of 
regional or international legitimacy.75 
In line with the latter quote, the report by HPCR and HEI points out that while armed 
groups are not a new phenomenon, “the types, motivations and how these groups fight 
have become far more diverse, complex, and complicated in the post-Cold War era”.76 
Subsequently, while some types of groups “are recognizable from the post-World War II 
struggles for power and resources, there are a plethora of other groups not easily 
recognized and which are, consequently, not dealt with easily and straightforwardly”.77  
Aware of these complexities, the report by HPCR and HEI refers to scholars such as 
Mohammad-Mohmoud Ould Mohamedou, Thomas X. Hammes, Richard Shultz and 
Christoper Coker, and argues that in considering NSAGs, it is important to first 
understand that they can range in size and capability from quite limited to very 
sophisticated.78 The report highlights that while some NSAGs display limited means and 
objectives, others have complex military and political wings. The group’s identity and 
power can be derived from “the manipulation of powerful ethnic, ethno-national, 
religious, and communal differences by competing elite”, and in this context, “are 
essentially opportunistic and use internal and transnational violence as the means for 
obtaining state resources and powers, secession, or group autonomy”.79 In following, the 
report emphasizes other important characteristics of NSAGs, and argues that any 
framework for understanding NSAGs, must make sense of these groups in all their 
different formations, and consider how and whether they might be engaged per this 
continuum.80  
As demonstrated in the latter section, there are different views on what exactly the 
concept of NSAGs entails. However, while there is uncertainty connected to the concept, 
there is definite agreement that NSAGs have increasingly come to dominate the 
landscape of warfare. I argue that the complex nature of NSAGs has two consequences 
related to this paper. First, it makes it difficult, and perhaps unproductive, to ascribe a 
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concrete definition to this concept. Second, the fact that there exists a great variety of 
NSAGs makes it hard to find one specific instrument that can function well for all and 
achieve the desired outcome. In other words, it would be naïve to suggest that parallel 
legal tools is a cure all solution. I will return to the latter point in chapter five.  
3.4 Parallel legal tools  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, the concept of parallel legal tools was briefly mentioned. 
However, additional attention must be given to this concept in order to understand what  
it entails.   
First of all, ‘parallel legal tools’, encompasses special agreements as referred to in CA 3 to 
the Geneva Conventions, unilateral declarations, and the inclusion of IHL principles in 
NSAGs codes of conduct. For the purpose of this thesis, I define parallel legal tools as 
written agreements on IHL, committed to and signed, in whole or part, by a non-state 
party to a non-international armed conflict. They are referred to as ‘parallel’ because they 
allow NSAGs, who cannot become parties to the traditional IHL treaties such as the 
Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols, to explicitly commit to existing 
obligations through alternative agreements. Alternative, or parallel agreements, are 
arguably necessary because the body of law known as IHL is primarily state centric in the 
sense that NSAGs have not, and cannot, participate in its making, nor provide their 
support through for instance signing or ratifying said treaties or agreements. The 
argument made for the usefulness of parallel agreements is that they are necessary in 
order to stimulate NSAGs ownership of the various elements of IHL because they in 
effect, as argued by Olivier Bangerter, “create accepted standards, instead of what is often 
considered as imposed standards”.81 
As previously mentioned, the existing framework of IHL is primarily state-centric, and 
due to legitimacy concerns, states have been unwilling to include NSAGs in dialogue or 
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negotiations on IHL.82 It is a fact that NSAGs have been unable to participate in the 
creation of IHL applicable in NIACs, although it is recognized that they are bound by its 
rules. It may be argued that in order to address IHL violations more effectively, NSAGs 
must be included, rather than excluded and ignored, by the international community. By 
utilizing parallel legal tools, one creates an opportunity for the NSAG to officially express 
commitment to comply with IHL, and in this regard, one could argue that NSAGs may 
develop a sense of ownership of IHL. NSAGs do not have legal standing under 
international law, and therefore, other international law instruments does not allow for 
NSAGs to become parties. The purpose of parallel legal tools is thus to create a platform 
from which NSAGs can specifically commit to complying with IHL through negotiated 
agreements or unilateral declarations. As put forth by Bangerter, its function comes not 
from changing the content of a group’s legal obligation, but rather, to put in place 
genuine commitment to the rules.83 The most important point to made with regards to 
parallel legal agreements is the fact that despite its purpose, it does not have the status or, 
nor is it able to produce binding legal consequences similar to those of a treaty. Its 
purpose solely comes from creating commitment and ownership from and for those that 
agree to adhere by it.   
There are a number of practical examples of a variety of parallel agreements that NSAGs 
have committed to. First of all, special agreements have been made between the parties to 
NIACs that have enabled the parties to make an explicit commitment to comply with 
IHL. These agreements are not only based on the legal framework, but also on the mutual 
consent of the parties, making it clear that the parties have the same IHL obligations.84  In 
1990, the government of El Salvador and the Frente Marti para la Liberacion Nacional 
(FMLN) made an agreement to comply with CA3 and AP II, as well as various human 
rights norms. Another example which has been argued to be a successful agreement is 
‘The Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law’ that was concluded between the government of the Philippines and 
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the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) in 1998.85 Secondly, there are 
various examples of situations where armed groups have made unilateral declarations, or 
declarations of intention, in which they state their commitment to comply with 
international humanitarian law. This may come about as a result of own initiative, or it 
may be come about as a result of the ICRCs or other actor’s advocacy.86 Relevant 
examples of unilateral declarations are references to comply with CA3 from the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria in 1956 or to both CA3 and AP II in 1988 by the 
FMLN in El Salvador and the NDFP in the Philippines in 1991. Also, in 1995, the 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia declared to commit itself to 
provisions of IHL without reference to specific treaty provisions.87 Thirdly, armed groups 
have included IHL in codes of conduct in order to set up mechanism that enables its 
members to respect the law. Armed groups have developed internal codes of conduct at 
their own initiative at one time or another in countries such as Algeria, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.88 
Perhaps one of the most significant examples of parallel legal tools in practice is the effort 
made by Geneva Call since 2000 to engage NSAGs in a ban on anti-personnel mines. The 
effort comes from a realization that it is necessary to involve NSAGs in order to 
effectively address the landmine problem. By 2010, the efforts had resulted in 41 NSAGs 
signing the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines 
and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC). In a progress report written in 2007, Geneva 
Call puts forth that signatory NSAGs have “by and large complied with Article 1 of the 
Deed of Commitment”89: 
TO ADHERE to a total ban on anti-personnel mines. By anti-personnel 
mines, we refer to those devices which effectively explode by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person, including other victim-
activated explosive devices and anti-vehicle mines with the same effect 
whether with or without anti-handling devices. By total ban, we refer to a 
complete prohibition on all use, development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, and transfer of such mines, under any 
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circumstances. This includes an undertaking on the destruction of all 
such mines.90 
The Deed of Commitment is a particularly interesting case, because its creation was a 
pioneer effort by a humanitarian organization that is strongly dedicated to engaging 
NSAGs in order to increase compliance with IHL and IHRL. The Deed of Commitment 
will be discussed and explored further in chapter five.  
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4 Perspectives on violations  
4.1 Purpose of chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how violations of IHL can be understood, 
and furthermore, to explore some of the methods and strategies that have been employed 
in the effort to increase respect for IHL. It will be argued that violations of IHL by 
NSAGs occur due to a variety of reasons, and that no single explanation can be identified. 
In following, this chapter will explore suggested methods to increase compliance with 
IHL, and conclude that parallel legal tools have potential that has yet to be fully explored. 
4.2 Explaining violations 
 
First of all, there have been various attempts within numerous of academic disciplines to 
understand and explain why human beings violate norms and rules, and there is no 
universal explanation as to why individuals bring suffering upon other individuals or 
groups of people, whether in times of war, or in times of peace. Toon Vandenhove, 
former ICRC head of the delegation in Sri Lanka, holds that: “the problem lies in the 
belief that these rules can be bend, that these rules are not so fundamental”.91 One of his 
arguments is that in situations of war, both states and non-state actors believe that 
exceptional situations call for exceptional measures, measures that are not consistent with 
IHL principles. Also, it is frequently argued that IHL violations occur due to matters of 
reciprocity. When one party to the conflict does not adhere to IHL, the other party 
justifies its violations on this very basis. On the matter of IHL application to NSAGs, it 
has also been argued that non-compliance occurs because there is simply no effective 
mechanism to prosecute violations.  
These are just some of the most commonly addressed explanations for why IHL is 
frequently violated. Considering the vast amount of literature found within psychology, 
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political science, history and other academic disciplines regarding human behaviour in 
war, it is fortunate that the ICRC published a study in 2004 that seeks to summarize 
information from a variety of sources such as readings, interviews, internal ICRC 
documents, articles, quantitative data and personal accounts. The study, written by Jean-
Jacques Frésard for the ICRC and entitled “The Roots of Behavior in War: A Survey of 
the Literature”, examines what determines the behaviour of combatants in wartime and 
what makes them respect or violate IHL. I will map out the various explanations for 
violations of IHL based on this study.  
Frésard states that “there are countless reasons for violations of IHL”.92 For analytical 
purposes, the study has divided the reasons into six categories, which “appear to 
encompass almost the entire range of events that can lead to non-compliance” with 
IHL.93 The categories are as follows: 1) war is conducive to criminal behaviour, 2) reasons 
relating to the aims of war, 3) reasons of expediency, 4) ideological reasons, 5) 
psychosociological reasons and 6) reasons related to the individual.94 The first category 
simply takes into account that war is brutal, it is essentially about defeating the enemy, 
and “even a war waged in accordance with IHL involves an unleashing of violence against 
persons and property with all the attendant suffering and destruction”.95 The second 
category addresses the modernity of war, the fact that wars are fought for many reasons, 
with various aims, and therefore carried out using different strategies. Frésard refers to 
wars over issues of identity, and wars known as asymmetrical conflicts, where attacking 
civilians is in itself a part of the strategy rather than “collateral damage”. The argument 
made is that “in such situations, the aims of war can be the very negation of the principles 
of IHL”.96 Although the armed group in question may be fully aware of the applicable 
rules, it does not want to comply because IHL violations such as indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians to spread terror may be a deliberate strategy. In these situations, the leadership 
promotes and support violations, and have no intention of adhering to IHL. Thirdly, it is 
pointed out that in many situations of war, it is viewed as necessary to violate IHL to 
overcome the enemy. The argument here can be summarized with a well-used phrase, 
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namely that “the ends justifies certain means, and the ends may be many”. Frésard lists 
the most frequently encountered reasons of expediency, among which one is related to 
the historical example of Hiroshimi and Nagasaki as “the determination to put an end to 
hostilities as quickly as possible and thus to avoid more casualties later”.97 The fourth 
category, ideological reasons, highlights the fact that ideology may drive combatants to 
believe that they are fighting a just cause where behaviour is attributed to ideologies that 
provide them with references, explanations and justifications. According to Frésard, one 
of the reasons frequently encountered in the fourth category is “the conviction that the 
group, ethnic community or nation is fighting for its very survival, and that consequently 
the humanitarian conventions no longer apply”.98 The fifth category addresses 
psychosociological explanations such as group influence, obedience to orders and the 
contagion of violence.99 Such explanations for human behavior have been studied to great 
length within the field of psychology, where perhaps the most famous examples are the 
Milgram experiment on obedience to authority and the work of Dr. Philip Zimbardo.100 
Lastly, the sixth category addresses the idea that some individuals take pleasure in the 
suffering of others, and puts forth the suggestion that sadistic tendencies within human 
beings find expression more freely in conflict situations.101 One of the overall conclusions 
drawn from this ICRC study is that although some violations of IHL are the result of 
passion, pathological behaviour or stress, violations are mostly the result of deliberate 
policies that either encourage or tolerate such behaviour. Consequently, the study argues 
that: “supervision of weapons-bearers, strict orders relating to proper conduct and 
effective penalties for failure to obey those orders are essential conditions which must all 
be met if there is to be any hope of securing better respect for IHL”. The second 
observation is that “we have to make IHL a judicial and political issue rather than a moral 
issue”.102 This second observation is highly relevant to the subject matter of this thesis. 
The use of parallel legal tools on NSAGs is arguably one of the ways in which one can 
                                                
97 ibid. p. 29 
98 ibid. p. 30 
99 ibid. 
100 Stanley Milgram, “Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority”, in Human Relations, Vol 18(1), 
1965, 57-76 and Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, Random House, New 
York, 2007  
101 Frésard, op. cit., p. 31 
102 ibid. p. 111 
41 
 
contribute to making IHL a judicial and political issue, rather than a moral issue. I will 
now proceed to explore suggestions on how one can increase compliance with IHL.  
4.3 Exploring ways to increase compliance with IHL 
 
Practitioners have proposed many different ways to enhance respect for IHL in armed 
conflict, and ensure greater compliance with existing rules. First of all, it must be pointed 
out that the number one strategy to achieve compliance with any law should be to 
sanction violations of that law. Enforcement is an important mechanism, and it should 
not be trivialised. However, as pointed out in the introductory section of this thesis, this is 
complicated when it comes to NSAGs, and therefore, other approaches to the issue at 
hand must be explored.  
With regards to the work of the ICRC, their strategy to increase respect for IHL is 
centred on dissemination and training activities.103 As such, these activities are aimed at 
those whose actions and behaviour can affect victims of armed conflict, such as armed 
forces, police, security forces and others bearing arms, as well as local decision-makers 
and opinion-leaders at the local and international level.104 According to Michelle Mack, 
this strategy is carried out on three levels: awareness-building, promotion of humanitarian 
law through teaching and training, and the integration of humanitarian law into official, 
legal, educational and operational curricula.105 Mack argues that through these efforts, the 
ICRC aims to influence the attitude and behaviour so as to improve protection for 
civilians and other victims of armed conflict, to facilitate access to these victims, and to 
improve security for humanitarian personnel.106 Claude Bruderlein, Director of the 
Program of Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard, proposes two distinct 
approaches that humanitarian and human rights organizations can utilize to increase 
compliance with humanitarian norms. It is emphasized that these strategies must come 
into play once a NSAG has agreed to comply with international standards.107 The first 
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approach argues that humanitarian organisations can engage in dialogue with NSAGs and 
assist them in building their capacity to respect IHL and IHRL, and builds on the 
assumption that the derivation of non-compliance comes from the NSAGs lack of 
capacity, rather than will, to ensure respect for international standards.108 Bruderlein 
argues that in practice, responsibility for the instruction and supervision of field 
commanders lies with the political leaders of a group, and therefore, it follows that 
responsibility for the enforcement of the rules and the prosecution of violations also lies 
with them.109 Thus, this responsibility is the basis for the group’s accountability for the 
respect of international standards, and it involves the ability to investigate violations as 
well as the capacity to impose corrective measures, including the prosecution and 
punishment of those found guilty of violating the rules.110 According to Bruderlein, 
capacity building begins with the establishment of a dialogue with leaders, and often, this 
requires the development of contact over time to create a fundament of trust.111 This 
approach may involve assistance from third parties, such as members of the diaspora, 
churches, political parties or NGOs, but is ultimately reliant on support and help from the 
international community.112 The second approach proposed by Bruderlein is the so called 
“naming and shaming” strategy. Humanitarian organisations can aim to exert pressure on 
the NSAG by “shaming it in front of the international public and its own constituency for 
violations of international standards”.113According to Bruderlein, this approach differs 
from the first with respect to its perception of the main obstacle to the implementation of 
international standards. It is proposed that the obstacle to implementing humanitarian 
norms is not the lack of capacity as with the first approach, but rather a lack of 
willingness, indicating the need for political pressure to obtain respect for the rules.114 The 
use of international public pressure is allegedly a preferred tool among human rights 
NGOs, and the purpose of this approach is to damage or question the NSAGs legitimacy 
within their own constituencies or domestic support groups, their diaspora and the 
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international community in general.115According to Bruderlein, naming and shaming may 
be more efficient with NSAGs that are dependent on international support for their war 
efforts, such as the rebel movements in southern Sudan and their support from the US 
government and American Christian support groups. This strategy will have a much more 
limited effect on NSAGs that rely on local constituencies and are not responsive to 
international public opinion, such as the Taliban movement.116 Bruderlein emphasizes 
that these two approaches are in fact complimentary, but argues that one should separate 
between the role of humanitarian organisations and the role of advocacy groups. Basically, 
his argument is that the second approach is more suitable for advocacy groups, whereas 
the first approach, namely efforts to establish dialogue with NSAGs, is best taken on by 
humanitarian organisations. As previously mentioned, the first approach is reliant on a 
fundament of trust. One could argue that a NSAG that has been named and shaped by a 
humanitarian organisation will most likely not be open to enter into dialogue with that 
particular organisation at a later point in time. Therefore, Bruderlein asserts that in order 
to ensure that both approaches are used in an optimal manner, efforts should be made to 
distinguish humanitarian organisations from advocacy groups, in terms of institution and 
mandate.117 Additionally, before using either of these approaches to increase NSAGs 
respect for IHL or IHRL norms, one should make a careful analysis of the most 
promising path to avoid making a wrongful assessment of the reasons why the NSAG 
fails to comply with the rules.118 If one assumes that the NSAGs non-compliance with 
IHL or IHRL is due to a lack of capacity, when it in fact can be attributed to a lack of 
will, the first strategy may very well end up serving no purpose.  
As Bruderlein, “The Roots of Behaviour in War” study bases its conceptual framework 
for changing combatants behaviour upon the various reasons for why combatants may 
violate the rules in war situations. Having established the key factors that influence the 
behaviour of combatants, the study suggests a conceptual framework for altering 
behaviour. The model is based on three main hypothesis: 1) that, just like civilians, 
combatants acknowledge and share humanitarian values because they are universal; 2) that 
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violations of IHL involve social and individual processes of moral disengagement brought 
about by two main mechanisms, namely the justification of behaviour and the lack of any 
sense of responsibility; 3) that, in situations of armed conflict, the mechanisms of this 
abdication of responsibility are induced chiefly by group conformity and obedience to 
orders.119 With regards to preventing violations of IHL, the study highlights three main 
lessons. First of all, one of the most important findings in this study is the fact that if IHL 
is perceived from a normative point of view, combatants are less tolerant of violations. It 
is argued that: “the perception that there are legal norms is more effective than the 
acknowledgements of moral requirements in keeping combatants out of the spiral of 
violence”.120 It is argued that IHL needs to be treated as a legal and political matter rather 
than as a moral one, and communication activities needs to focus on the norms rather 
than on their underlying values because the idea that the bearer of weapons is morally 
autonomous is inappropriate.121 Appealing to norms rather than morality allows one to 
draw an easily identifiable red line, and it is argued that values represent a broader 
spectrum that is less focused and more relative.122 Secondly, the study concludes that 
training, orders and sanctions play a crucial role in efforts to achieve increased respect for 
IHL. This is based on Munoz-Rojas and Frésard’s contention that the behaviour of 
combatants is determined mainly by three parameters: (1) their position within a group, 
which leads them to behave in conformity with what the group expects of them; (2) their 
position in a hierarchical structure which leads them to obey authority (because they 
perceive it as legitimate or it acts on them as coercive force, or a mixture of the two); (3) 
the process of moral disengagement favoured by the war situation, which authorizes 
recourse to violence against those defined as being the enemy.123 To effectively alleviate 
these three parameters that shape the behaviour of combatants, the study concludes that: 
“the rules must be translated into specific mechanisms and care must be taken to ensure 
that practical means are set in place to make this respect effective”.124 Based on this 
contention, the authors favour a integrative approach, which basically means that IHL is 
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included in military policies, taught to officers and to the rank and file, incorporated into 
exercises and training, and more importantly, incorporated into the orders passed down 
through the chain of command, and that combatants are given the necessary means of 
ensuring that their behaviour can indeed comply with IHL.125 It is also highlighted that 
sanctions, either disciplinary or penal, are necessary when combatants fail to comply with 
the rules. The authors argue that it is: “essential that the authorities should take action”126, 
however, they do not mention how sanctions are to be executed when dealing with 
NSAGs.127 This line of reasoning rests on the belief that humanitarian organisations such 
as the ICRC cannot convince combatants to act according to IHL principles, and are 
unlikely to be able to win them over personally.128 Instead, the potential of success rests 
on being able to influence those that have ascendancy over the combatants, beginning 
with the instigators of any “excessive” violence and including those who prepare the 
political, ideological and moral ground so as to dehumanize the enemy.129  
4.3.1 Parallel legal tools as a way to increase compliance  
 
As demonstrated above, there are various reasons for why IHL is violated, and similarly, 
there are numerous of suggestions on how compliance with IHL can be improved. 
However, some overall ideas can be identified. First of all, it is highly relevant to point out 
that one of the main conclusions from the ICRC study was that: “violations are mostly 
the result of deliberate policies that either encourage or tolerate such behaviour”. With 
this in mind, one could arguably make the case that compliance with IHL must also be a 
deliberate policy, and most of all an accepted policy, committed to by the leadership and 
translated onto its soldiers. Secondly, the study highlights it as crucial to make IHL a 
judicial and political issue rather than a moral issue. This is also pointed out by Bruderlein, 
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who argues that one needs to appeal to legal norms, rather than morality when working to 
increasing respect for IHL.  
In 2010, one of the leading scholars within the field of IHL, Marco Sassóli, argued that 
one of the ways in which one can enforce international law against armed groups is “to 
enforce IHL directly and through international mechanisms against the armed group as a 
group”.130 According to Sassóli, this particular method is more innovate and less explored 
than the other two methods, state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility. 
Sassóli argues that the other two approaches have their advantages, but points to several 
reasons for why he chooses to focus on the use of international mechanisms against the 
NSAGs as a way to facilitate compliance. First of all, it is pointed out that governments 
often do not have the capacity to control or even influence NSAGs, and therefore, 
attribution is difficult to prove because specific instructions, or other forms of direction 
and control exercised by the state, remain secret.131 Secondly, it is argued that for 
individual criminal responsibility to be an effective measure against violations of IHL, one 
must be certain that violations are enforced through a fair trial where the facts and their 
individual attribution have to be proved.132 In regards to NSAGs however, it is put forth 
that criminal prosecution of members of an armed group by outside tribunals is less 
effective as a deterrent than is punishment by the group itself. Another important point 
made by Sassóli in regards to this particular point is the fact that for a member of an 
armed group, rejection by their own group, or their own social environment, has a greater 
stigmatizing effect than rejection by the international community or other states.133 As 
mentioned, the idea that it is necessary to engage with armed groups to increase respect 
for IHL is according to Sassóli more innovative and less explored. However, it is argued 
that this idea has become increasingly respected. To demonstrate the accuracy of this 
statement, he points to the 2009 report by the Secretary General to the Security Council, 
where increasing compliance with IHL by NSAGs is referred to as one of the “five core 
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challenges”, and where ten out of 78 paragraphs talks about the need to engage and not 
only condemn NSAGs.134 
I have argued that engagement efforts through legal tools with NSAGs can increase 
compliance with IHL because they translate obligation into specific commitment, because 
they appeal to legal norms, rather than moral, and lastly, because engagement efforts are 
widely acknowledged as a more modern and effective way of addressing NSAGs. 
However, it is important to take note that I do not argue that this alone will be effective, 
but rather that the goal of increasing NSAGs compliance with IHL may be achieved by 
combining this tool with the other mechanisms mentioned, such as training, orders and 
sanctions, and dissemination of IHL by external actors such as the ICRC. Also, it must be 
mentioned that it would be naïve to assert that this tool, in combination with other tools, 
provides a cure all apparatus that will end all violations of IHL committed by the vast 
number of NSAGs that operate at current. This will be discussed further at the end of the 
subsequent chapter, where I will put forth a threefold approach that contributes to a 
deeper understanding of how and why parallel legal tools can lead to strengthened respect 
for IHL, and examine for whom this tool may prove valuable.  
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5 A threefold approach 
 
5.1 Purpose of chapter 
 
As put forth in the introductory section of this paper, chapter five takes on a threefold 
approach to explore how parallel legal tools may facilitate compliance. The purpose of 
this chapter is thus to understand how, and why, this tool may potentially serve to 
increase respect for IHL. The first approach will probe into IHRL research and 
investigate the assumption that “legality matters” by discussing the value of signed 
agreements in generating compliance. The purpose of the first approach is thus to use 
reasoning from IHRL theory on commitment and compliance and discuss whether this is 
transferrable to NSAGs and IHL compliance. The second approach will build upon the 
assumption that “ownership matters”, and analyse existing empirical knowledge on 
NSAGs and IHL, first through a general perspective, and secondly, through a more case 
specific perspective. The purpose of the second approach is to identify whether specific 
commitment to IHL by NSAGs through parallel legal tools may generate ownership of 
the law, which in turn may have an impact on compliance. The third approach will build 
upon the assumption that there is no “cure all”, and use elements from the two first 
approaches to establish that group characteristics play a decisive role in the success or 
failure of parallel legal tools.  
5.2 Legality matters   
 
Through qualitative and quantitative research, Beth Simmons has published one of the 
most comprehensive studies on the effectiveness of international law on human rights 
practices. In “Mobilizing for Human Rights”, Simmons claims that international legal 
arrangements have an important role to play in creating an atmosphere in which human 
rights are increasingly respected. In the following two sections, I will outline Simmons 
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research, as well as research from other scholars within the field of IHRL, on 
commitment and compliance with IHRL and discuss its applicability to NSAGs and IHL.  
5.2.1 Commitment to IHRL and applicability to NSAGs and IHL 
 
In “Mobilizing for Human Rights” Simmons attempts to answer the following question: 
“Why should a sovereign government explicitly agree to subject its domestic rights 
practices to the standards and, increasingly, the scrutiny of the rest of the world?”135 Her 
prime theoretical assumption is that governments ratify treaties largely because they 
believe they can and should comply with them. However, as stated by Simmons, we do 
know that there is not a perfect correspondence between ratification and compliance, and 
therefore, it is essential to theorize this discrepancy.136 For analytical purposes, Simmons 
argues for the usefulness of thinking about three categories of governments: (1) the 
sincere ratifiers, those that value the content of the treaty and anticipate compliance; (2) 
the false negatives, those that may be committed in principle but nonetheless fail to ratify; 
and (3) the strategic ratifiers, those that ratify because others do and prefer to avoid the 
criticism generated by non-ratification - also referred to as the false positives because they 
ratify for externally motivated strategic reasons.137  
The first important finding from Simmons research is that governments ratify because 
they intend to comply, and the evidence presented by Simmons shows that ratification is 
more probable when a government believes that their preferences line up with the 
contents of the treaty.138 On the other hand, Simmons findings show that nondemocratic 
governments have been systematically reluctant to commit themselves to the contents of 
legal arrangements concerning civil and political rights.139 Regarding the matter of social 
rights, Simmons has found that governments who promote social values that fit uneasily 
with the norms reflected in these treaties are also systemically unlikely to commit.140 This 
argument is exemplified by the case of how predominately Muslim societies have been 
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reluctant to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).141 The second finding is, according to Simmons, that “the 
nature of the legal system itself can create resistance against the ready acceptance of the 
international human rights regime”.142 It is argued that this is one of the consequences of 
trying to import externally negotiated political agreements into a locally and organically 
grown system of precedent, and Simmons believes that the nature of the legal system 
accounts for the false negatives – the supportive but uncommitted states.143 The third 
important observation, as highlighted by Simmons, concerns the question on why 
governments would sign on to a treaty that they have no intention of complying with. It is 
argued that some governments engage in this so-called opportunistic ratification, but also, 
that they are conscious of when such insincere commitments should be made because of 
the short-term benefits associated with ratification. Simmons proposes a number of 
benefits brought about by ratification, such as a sense of joining the world’s law-abiding 
states, avoiding criticism, gaining international praise, a strengthened claim to participate 
in future international rights discussions, and the support of some domestic 
constituency.144 Insincere ratification however, is likely to be exposed, and accordingly, 
benefits gained are likely to materialize only in the short run.145 Furthermore, Simmons 
argues that perhaps one of the most striking findings regarding ratification and 
commitment to IHRL is “the evidence that identifies strategic ratification with particular 
conditions”.146 Simmons research has shown that governments in countries that have 
never been democratic tend to ratify international human rights treaties later in their 
terms in office, which indicates a legacy motive consistent with short time horizons. 
Accordingly, Simmons argues that “the later a dictator ratifies, the more immediate the 
gratification and the more limited the likely repercussions”.147 On the other hand, 
Simmons could not detect any such behaviour for governments in democracies, whom it 
is argued are much more likely to be among the sincere ratifiers in the first place. The last 
important finding highlighted by Simmons is the extent to which governments tend to be 
                                                
141 ibid. 
142 ibid. 
143 ibid. 
144 ibid. p. 110 
145 ibid. 
146 ibid. 
147 ibid.  
51 
 
influenced by the decisions made by other governments in their region. It is stated that 
this is a very interesting dynamic of the international human rights regime, because 
regional effects surface in practically every measure of commitment – from ratification to 
reservations to the acceptance of optional protocols (OPs).148 According to Simmons, her 
research shows that governments tend to time their ratifications – even coordinate their 
ratifications – to keep in step with other countries in their region.149 Lastly, it is concluded 
that it is evident that government ratify human rights treaties for both sincere and 
strategic reasons. Before turning to discuss the question of compliance with international 
law, Simmons argues that governments  “calculate the costs versus the benefits in the 
context of their values, region, national institutions, and time horizons”.150  
As pointed out, commitment is more likely to occur when intention to comply is present, 
and also, when the content of the treaty line up with the preferences of the ratifier.  
However, it seems that an assessment of whether intention was present at the time of 
ratification is difficult, both in relation to IHRL and states, and IHL and NSAGs. A 
simple statement of intention to comply with the given parallel agreement on IHL is not 
necessarily genuine, and as Simmons argues in relation to states and IHRL, there are three 
categories of ratifiers; the sincere, the false negatives and the strategic. When it comes to 
NSAGs and commitment to IHL, one could argue that the three categories are 
appropriate and fitting, though as mentioned, intentions are hard to analyze. First of all, 
NSAGs may be sincere when committing to a parallel legal agreement on IHL, indicating 
that the content of the agreement is valued, and compliance could be anticipated. As 
argued by Bangerter, “conviction that respect for IHL is the right thing goes a much 
longer way”.151  He points out that when the NDFP embarked on the CARHRIHL 
process at a time when they were “correcting errors”, including harsh treatment of 
civilians for logistical purposes; they were still convinced that respect for IHRL and IHL 
was in their best interest.152 In one of his articles on this issue, Bangerter puts forth that 
some NSAGs actually consider that in their struggle for better rights for the people, 
respecting IHL is important. In fact, it is suggested that groups with a serious 
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commitment to IHL are more numerous than the cursory might suggest.153 Furthermore, 
an analysis of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), who was the 
first NSAG to sign the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) in 2001, showed that 
humanitarian issues played a role in the signing of the DoC, in addition to other 
factors.154  
With regard to the second category, the false negatives, those that may be committed in 
principle but nonetheless fail to ratify, one could argue that if a NSAG believes it lacks 
the capacity to implement the provisions in the agreement, it could cause them to fall into 
this second category. Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes argue that lack of 
capacity can be one of the reasons why governments violate treaty requirements and fail 
to comply, especially when it comes to the differences in resources between developing 
and developed countries.155 It could be argued that if a NSAG sees that it is lacking 
capacity to effectively implement the provisions of a parallel agreement, it would avoid 
entering into a specific commitment to circumvent the risk of loosing face to those 
monitoring the agreement and to its own constituency. Sassóli argues that it is more 
difficult for NSAGs to implement IHL than it is for a government with a structure and 
institutions in place, for instance in regard to the difficulties some NSAGs face in 
ensuring compliance with IHL by its members.156 Another example of lacking capacity 
could be related to the fact that to prosecute violations of IHL, the NSAG must comply 
with the judicial guarantees of IHL, and this may be difficult in practice.157 This particular 
point is also connected to the third approach that will be dealt with at the end of this 
chapter, namely that group characteristics influence the potential of parallel legal tools.  
A strategic ratification of a parallel legal tool, or what is referred to as a “false positive”, 
by a NSAG is not necessarily a bad thing if it can contribute to generating rule-consistent 
behavior. A paper written by the ICRC for the International Humanitarian Law Research 
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Initiative in 2004 argues that in the effort to increase respect for IHL by NSAGs, one 
may find it beneficial to appeal to strategic arguments. The leadership could be 
approached and counseled that compliance can lead to possible gains for the NSAGs, 
such as reciprocity by the state in treatment of detained members of the NSAGs, 
increased effectiveness and cohesiveness of the NSAGs itself, greater legitimacy as a 
political actors, increased likelihood of dialogue with the state, facilitation of humanitarian 
aid to areas affected by conflict and greater protection for civilians.158 It was previously 
mentioned that one of the reasons why the SPLM/A entered into the DoC in 2001 was 
due to humanitarian concerns. However, the same analysis also showed that strategic 
reasons played a role, such as the realization that the use of mines had low strategic value, 
their dependence on financial and technical support, their internal and external need for 
legitimacy, transnational pressure and the costs of an eventual assumption of power.159  
Strategic argumentation to achieve ratification of a parallel legal agreement may thus be 
effective when dealing with NSAGs. If the NSAG in question is not convinced at the 
time of entering into the parallel legal agreement that compliance with the content of the 
agreement is at its best interest, strategic arguments from humanitarian agents may in the 
long-run convince the NSAGs that compliance is the best way to go. If increased 
compliance with IHL by NSAGs can be achieved by appealing to strategic arguments, 
though the commitment to a parallel legal tool in this regard is not necessarily as sincere 
as with the first category, it would be a positive contribution to improving the lives of 
those affected by conflict. However, NSAGs can also be true “false positives” that simply 
choose to enter into a parallel legal agreement because it sees the value of the short-term 
benefits it would give them. As argued by Simmons:   
The single strongest motive for ratification in the absence of a strong 
value commitment is the preference that nearly all governments have to 
avoid the social and political pressures of remaining aloof from a 
multilateral agreement to which most of their peers have already 
committed themselves.160  
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Due to the general negative perception of NSAGs, parallel legal agreements to show 
support for recognized international norms may be entered into by NSAGs for the exact 
same reasons as Simmons argues is true for states, such as avoiding criticism, gaining 
international praise, a strengthened claim to participate in future international rights 
discussions, and the support of some domestic constituency. This behaviour, described as 
opportunistic ratification, is perhaps particularly important for NSAGs that have 
territorial control, or de facto control, of a certain area, because their dependence upon 
domestic support is quite strong. Though their failure to comply with the agreement is 
likely to be exposed sooner, rather than later, it may still be the case that they can thrive 
from the false commitment for a valuable amount of time. In 1998, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) made a number of pronouncements, of which some were 
directed to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to respect IHL that did not 
lead to significant long-term changes.161 These pronouncements however, are not 
equivalent to a parallel legal agreement, and it is impossible to predict whether a formal 
written agreement, rather than an oral pronouncement would have changed the outcome 
of this particular situation.  
5.2.2 Compliance with IHRL and applicability to NSAGs and IHL 
 
Commitment to legal agreements does not automatically produce treaty-consistent 
behaviour, and therefore, it is crucial to discuss for whom and under what circumstance 
legal agreements have a positive effect. As pointed out by Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, quantitative research has presented diverging views on the effectiveness 
of law. Hathaway and Hafner-Burton have argued that laws often do not work very well, 
Simmons suggests that there is hope in democratizing states, while Neunmayer argues 
that IHRL is most effective in already democratic states.162 In “Mobilizing for Human 
Rights”, Simmons attempts to answer the following question: “why – or under what 
conditions – do governments comply with their international human rights treaty 
commitment?” In order to answer this question, Simmons touches upon frequently 
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visited explanations for why states comply with international legal commitments. It is 
argued that the most common answer is “that treaties reflect the power and the interests 
of the states that take part in their negotiations, and add little to an understanding of why 
governments behave the way the do post-ratification”. As argued by realists, governments 
may comply if a treaty does not engage a national interest, or comply if a treaty is 
consistent with national interests.163 The main argument proposed by this school of 
thought, according to Simmons, is that governments will not honour international human 
rights treaties when it is not in their interest to do so.164 Also, it is pointed out that realists 
would argue that treaties have little purchase over government behaviour because they are 
not likely to be enforced. The realist view would therefore suggest that compliance with 
IHRL could be achieved through enforcement. However, Simmons dismisses this 
suggestion by arguing that globally centralised enforcement is a chimera, and so far, there 
have been no evidence suggesting a strong and consistent interest in enforcing IHRL in 
other countries.165 In the absence of central authority, theories of self-enforcing 
agreements are explored, arguing that international agreements rely on the interests of the 
parties themselves or the international community to keep the cooperation coming.166 
According to Simmons, much of the early thinking of cooperation theorists relied on the 
logic of self-enforcing agreements.167 Compliance is theorised as something that is 
brought about by various mechanisms, such as reciprocity; the risk that another player 
will exit the agreement rather than tolerate cheating, and reputation; the risk of gaining a 
reputation as a unreliable treaty partner can influence the willingness of others to 
negotiate mutually beneficial agreements in a broader range of issues”.168  Simmons 
argues that this approach explains compliance by the ability to structure incentives in such 
a way as to make non-compliance too costly to consider in the absence of third-party 
enforcement. However so, Simmons dismisses the theory on self-enforcing agreements 
on the basis that the mechanisms proposed are completely inappropriate in the human 
rights area. With regards to the matter of reputational sanctions, it is argued that in 
relation to human rights, governments have typically been reluctant to impose costs on all 
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but the most egregious rights abusers.169 It is also argued that international signalling 
models are not helpful, because they see treaties as screens but not constraints on state 
action.170 Having rejected the main explanatory models for treaty compliance, Simmons 
suggests a theoretical reorientation of the compliance problem which is based on the idea 
that human rights matters the most for the citizens empowered by treaties. Thus, it is 
argued that the international explanations for international human rights compliance are 
not particularly plausible, but rather, one must look closely at domestic mechanisms. 
Accordingly, Simmons proposes three mechanisms through which treaties may have 
effects in domestic politics. First, described as a modest but not trivial mechanism, 
treaties may contribute to altering the national agenda. It is argued that “treaties can have 
an important influence on national politics simply because they alter the substantive 
priorities of the legislative agenda compared to what it would have been in the absence of 
an exogenously presented treaty obligation”.171 However, Simmons notes that agenda 
effects should be most noticeable in those that are regarded as sincere ratifiers, and it is 
suggested that the prime candidates for such effects are expected to be the Western 
democracies.172Also, agenda-setting effects are “likely to be most pronounced in polities 
in which legislatures tend to have relatively greater control over the national agenda”. 
With regards to this mechanism, Simmons argues that the ideal type case where one can 
expect strong agenda-setting effects from treaty ratification is in a highly democratic 
parliamentary or presidential system.173 Secondly, it is proposed that treaties can be used 
to litigate in national courts, which can influence the further development of rights 
jurisprudence, alter the political costs of non-compliance and stimulate the politics of 
rights mobilization going forward.174 As with the latter however, this mechanism is reliant 
on certain preconditions, such as well functioning domestic courts. Simmons suggests 
that for litigation to be an important compliance mechanism, treaties have to be 
enforceable in domestic courts and litigation itself must be meaningful.175 Thus, evidence 
shows that “treaties have stronger effects in countries with more independent judicial 
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systems”, which according to Simmons “would be consistent with the litigation 
mechanism”.176 In states where courts are relatively free from political interference, 
treaties as legal instruments should have the greatest potential to influence policy.177 
Thirdly, it is argued that treaties can provide resources and incite social mobilization. 
However, in states where the government is so firmly ensconced that it can ignore social 
movements, or in states that are so democratic that social movements are unlikely to form 
in the first place, this third mechanism may not reach it intended purpose.178 This kind of 
rights mobilization is according to Simmons quantitative research relatively low in 
autocracies because people are vary of the consequences, but it is also relatively low in 
democracies because treaties are largely redundant.179 
Certainly, Simmons makes an interesting argument concerning the three mechanisms, 
however, considering how in a highly democratic systems the citizens may already enjoy 
human rights to a certain extent, her argument seems a bit too obvious. As argued by 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, evidence suggests that human rights laws are most effective 
in stable or consolidating democracies or in states with strong civil society activism, which 
indicates that treaties may be failing in states that are in most need of reform.180 The 
authors conduct a more narrow analysis on the effectiveness of IHRL than Simmons, 
focusing on the worst offenders, and pursue the argument that treaties have failed to 
change the world’s worst abusers – even though they have been the targets of the human 
rights regime from the beginning.181 It is proposed that theories of compliance are “to 
some extent divorced from research”, because current studies arguing that treaties work 
in democracies are largely ignoring the dynamics of compliance. First, it is suggested that 
we must consider what we know about effectiveness, and it is argued that despite the 
diverging views on the effectiveness of treaties, current scholarship implies that human 
rights laws matter least among governments that were the primary targets of the legal 
regime – repressive, autocratic states without internal advocates for reform.182 Second, the 
authors propose that one must consider what we know about the dynamics of treaty 
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compliance, and it is argued that conformity with international law is a domestic political 
process. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui propose that efforts to implement IHRL are 
dependent on political will and political capacity, which is probably hardest to build in 
repressive non-democracies.183 Furthermore, it is highlighted that the extensive amount of 
empirical research has not effectively analysed whether treaty effectiveness fluctuates over 
time. Scholars such as Neunmayer and Keith found no direct empirical relationship 
between ratification of IHRL treaties and changing behaviour the same year as 
ratification.184 Also, in 2005, Hafner-Burton found no significant association between 
ratification of any of the core UN human rights laws and protection of people from 
political terror one year after ratification.185 The authors point out that all three of these 
studies ignore the basic theoretical argument that soft laws generally take longer to be 
implemented.186 Other researchers, such as Hathaway in 2002 and Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui in 2005 have examined this dynamic by analysing the duration in years since 
ratification of the core UN human rights laws and behaviour consistent with the treaties. 
In testing the proposition that human rights treaties are more effective in bringing about 
compliance as the years go on, they found no evidence.187 It is argued that neither of 
these studies are good tests of dynamic theories of international law, because with regards 
to human rights, learning or capacity-building is unlikely to take place at a steady or 
uniform pace over time.188 In following, the authors advance four propositions about 
repressive governments compliance with international human rights law: (1) an impressive 
cascade of norms has taken place in the realm of international justice; (2) the problem is 
not just a methodological one; treaty commitments to the pursuit of justice have no clear 
or independent effects on most very repressive state’s behaviours, either immediately or, 
more importantly, long into the future; (3) recent findings that treaty effectiveness is 
conditional on democracy and civil society do not explain the behaviour of the world’s 
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serious repressors; and (4) most realistic institutional reforms and unlikely to help 
much.189 
With this pessimism in mind, it is crucial to revisit an important element, one that is 
highlighted as Simmons most important conclusions regarding compliance, and perhaps 
one of the most relevant findings as for the subject matter of this paper, namely the idea 
that “treaties have significant effects, but they do not have the same effects 
everywhere”.190 As pointed out by Simmons, and as highlighted previously, it is quite clear 
that one can separate between the sincere ratifiers and the strategic ratifiers. It is argued 
that one should expect the sincere ratifiers to have better human rights practices than the 
latter.191 However, Simmons believes that in order to argue that ratification affects 
ongoing practices of policy and rights; one must develop a theory of how treaties matter 
in the politics of both willing and resistant states.192 Through qualitative and quantitative 
research, Simmons proposes three types and argues that treaties have different effects on 
1) stable democracies, 2) stable autocracies and 3) states that are in between the two latter 
categories.193 She argues that political institutions in stable democracies, such as Norway, 
will not change much due to a political human rights treaty commitment. In states that fall 
into this category, the treaties may be readily accepted, but they are often redundant.194 
Simmons bases this argument on the idea that in stable democracies, political rights are - 
and have been for a while - largely protected, and therefore treaty ratification adds very 
little political activity to what is already considered as guaranteed protections.195  On the 
other hand, in stable autocracies, treaties are largely irrelevant because potential political 
actors simply do not have the resources to effectively demand change.196 However, 
according to Simmons, there is a third type, namely those states that are neither stable 
democracies, nor stable autocracies. These countries are generally characterised by 
unstable political institutions, and it is argued that in these states, even the most politically 
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sensitive human rights treaties have significant positive effects.197 Simmons reasoning 
regarding typology, and the central argument that treaties have significant effects, but they 
do not have the same effects everywhere, is most interesting in the context of this thesis. 
This point will be revisited in section 5.4.  
In the article “On Compliance”, Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes argue that 
the realist assumption asserts that states decide whether to comply or not through a 
calculation of costs and benefits, implying that noncompliance is a premeditated and 
deliberate violation of a treaty obligation.198 Before presenting what they argue is the 
explanation for non-compliant behaviour, Handler Chayes and Chayes refer to the area of 
international human rights, and state that it happens that states enter into international 
agreements to appease domestic or international constituencies although they have little 
intention of implementing the agreement.199 This is consistent with the argument brought 
forth in the latter section on false positives. A rather interesting suggestion made by the 
authors is that only infrequently does a treaty violation fall into the category of a “wilful 
flouting of legal obligation”. If deliberate violations of treaty obligations are rare, what can 
explain non-compliant behaviour? Handler Chayes and Chayes discuss three 
circumstances that lie at the root of violations, and that are, according to them, 
infrequently recognized in discussions on compliance: 1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of 
treaty language, 2) limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, 
and 3) the temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated by 
regulatory treaties.200 In relation to NSAGs, circumstance two is of particular interest, as 
empirical studies suggest that many NSAGs fail to comply with IHL obligations due to a 
lack of capacity. In this regard, capacity could for instance be the lack of the command 
structure it requires to keep soldiers under a “tight leash” and demand that they follow 
certain orders that are not in violation of IHL principles. A destructured group with 
unclear leadership, or with untrained and inexperienced soldiers is another example of a 
situation where limitations on the capacity of the party could lead to IHL violations. 
Capacity in relation to NSAGs could also be the lack of knowledge of the principles of 
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IHL. NSAGs that operate as guerrilla groups, moving fast and often with no set 
headquarters may find it difficult to uphold IHL principles relating to the treatment of 
prisoners or detainees.  AP II, Article 5, part 2 (b) states that detainees shall be allowed to 
send and receive letters and cards, which may prove difficult in practical terms if one is 
located in the midst of the jungle. Furthermore, CA 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which 
applies in NIACs, states that: “the sick and wounded shall be collected and cared for”.201 
Unless the particular group had a doctor present at all time, or was properly trained in 
medical aid, it would arguably be difficult for the group to fulfil the requirements that 
enemy combatants receive medical treatment for wounds or injuries inflicted during 
battle. In guerrilla warfare, instead of spending time and energy trying to move an injured 
enemy combatant so that he or she can receive medical treatment, soldiers would perhaps 
contend that shooting him or her is the rational thing to do because they lack the capacity 
to transport the injured soldier. The luxury of military helicopters that are able to 
transport wounded soldiers hundreds of kilometres in a matter of minutes, rather than 
days, is arguably not easily accessible to most NSAGs.   
Handler Chayes and Chayes argue that there are differences in capacity to implement 
between states, depending on whether they are classified as developing or industrialised 
states. They refer to how four years after the Montreal Protocol was ratified; the great 
majority of non-compliers were developing states that needed technical assistance from 
the treaty organization in order to implement the protocol.202 In situations where states 
are unable to implement or uphold international legal agreements, it may be due to lack of 
scientific, technological, bureaucratic or financial capacity. In situations where NSAGs fail 
to respect applicable IHL, one may find the same to be true for NSAGs that want, but 
lack capacity, to respect the principles of IHL that they are legally bound by.   
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5.3 Ownership matters  
 
In 2010, a UN report noted that:  
whether engagement was sought with armed groups in Afghanistan, 
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Yemen or 
elsewhere, experience shows that lives can be saved by engaging armed 
groups in order to seek compliance with international humanitarian 
law.203 
 
The above quote demonstrates how inclusion and engagement with NSAGs to promote 
compliance with IHL has become relatively accepted on a global scale, and shown 
through experience to be practically efficient. The following section will discuss how 
engagement with NSAGs to generate ownership of IHL is crucial to ensure compliance 
by putting forth two perspectives; the general and the case specific. In this regard, 
ownership of IHL can be defined as the end-result of a process, in which the NSAG is 
voluntarily, and willingly, engaged in the creation of the applicable rules, familiar with the 
norms that they are expected to comply with, committed formally and personally to 
upholding the provisions in the agreement, and responsible for effectively implementing 
the rules in their conduct of hostilities.   
5.3.1 The general perspective  
 
As previously demonstrated, there are a variety of explanations for NSAGs non-
compliance with IHL, and consequently, scholars and practitioners have proposed a 
number of mechanisms that may lead to compliance. However, in the last few years, one 
of the arguments most frequently invoked when attempting to explain NSAGs non-
compliance with IHL is the following: IHL remains primarily state-centric. It is discussed, 
created and ratified by states, and still, only a small portion of IHL applies to internal 
conflicts. Dawn Steinhoff addresses the nature of IHL in an article discussing state 
legitimacy concerns with engaging NSAGs, and argues that: “the laws that regulate the 
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conduct of the parties during conflicts (…) still reflect the state-centric international 
system. Only portions of the laws of war (...) apply to internal conflicts”.204 This particular 
issue is addressed in the previously referenced report by HPCR and HEI which argues 
that “foremost amongst these (challenges) is the fact that states are the building blocks of 
the international system and, as such, remain in control of international law and policy-
making”.205 Furthermore, the President of the ICRC, Dr. Kellenberger points out that: 
“ultimately, only states can influence the evolution of international law”.206 The fact of the 
matter is that NSAGs cannot become parties to treaties and cannot influence the law that 
they are essentially legally bound by. The contention that the state-centric nature of IHL 
is of hindrance to increasing compliance by NSAGs is not only furthered by scholars and 
practitioners, but also by NSAGs themselves. According to the ICRC, NSAGs have 
denied the applicability of IHL by refusing to recognize a body of law created by states, or 
by claiming that they cannot be bound by obligations ratified by the government against 
whom they are fighting.207 As mentioned in the introductory section of this thesis, one of 
the arguments for application of IHL to NSAGs is that they are bound as citizens of the 
state. Considering the fact that NSAGs are, in most cases, challengers to the power of the 
state, it seems unlikely that one could encourage compliance from NSAGs by appealing 
to this argument.  
In a policy brief commissioned for the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on 
Global Security, David Capie and Pablo Policzer argue that NSAGs present a complex 
policy challenge. It is stated that:  
The traditional instruments to curb human rights and humanitarian 
abuses were developed for use against states. Because states have 
diplomatic relations with other states, can sign treaties and be parties to 
major international institutions, a toolkit of familiar instruments is 
available to deal with them when they fail to uphold international 
standards. These range from quiet diplomacy through to more coercive 
instruments such as economic sanctions, and – ultimately – the use of 
force.208 
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Capie and Policzer highlight that within this state-centric framework, NSAGs are 
increasingly being recognized as key players in armed conflicts, and the humanitarian and 
human rights communities are starting to hold NSAGs to the same standard behaviour as 
states. They argue that although more is now expected from armed groups, “our policy 
toolkit has not kept pace with the changing time”. Furthermore, they point out that: “if 
armed groups are to be held accountable for violations of humanitarian norms, they have 
to be assigned responsibility for ending them”.209 Through parallel legal tools, one creates 
a functionally similar, though not equivalent in scope or legality, tool that addresses 
NSAGs directly and contributes to increasing NSAGs ownership of the law. As blatantly 
put in an e-mail from Dr. Olivier Bangerter, who has met, spoken with and engaged with 
a large number of NSAGs and who currently holds a position at the ICRC as advisor for 
the dialogue with armed groups: “I would draw the causal link between ownership of the 
law and compliance, because you cannot have compliance without some sort of 
ownership”.210 Through engaging with NSAGs, one addresses the problem of non-
compliance directly, and assigns greater responsibility and accountability to NSAGs for 
upholding the law. The ICRC has suggested that:  
better accountability by armed groups for international humanitarian law 
might be achieved by granting them an opportunity to express their 
consent to be bound by the rules, something not provided for in existing 
IHL treaty law. The express consent would provide evidence of 
willingness to comply and could make a tremendous impact in terms of 
dissemination.211  
 
In practice, the express consent could be a parallel legal tool such as a special agreement 
committed to and signed by the NSAG. By participating in the creation of the agreement, 
acknowledging the applicable rules, and making a genuine commitment to complying with 
the provisions in the agreement, the NSAG would get a greater sense of ownership for 
the law as compared to what the traditional state-centred framework provides. According 
to Sassóli, this involves a commitment and obliges leaders to think about what the 
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abstract rules mean in practice for their way of fighting and translates the legal provisions 
into instructions that are understandable for the group in question.212 The idea that 
ownership of the law is connected to rule-consistent behavior is arguably not 
revolutionary. As pointed out by Professor René Provost, director at the McGill Centre 
for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism and contributor to “On the Edges of Conflict 
project”, this perspective is “frankly that of legal pluralism, (…) which sees a continuum 
between formal legal processes leading to the adoption of rules and the gradual 
construction of legal meaning through every type of human interaction”.213 Furthermore, 
he argues that: “for legal norms to have more than theoretical meaning, individuals and 
groups must commit to hem, either individually or collectively, publicly or privately”.214 
As such, one could argue that parallel legal tools serves as a mechanism for NSAGs to 
develop a sense of IHL as having more than theoretical meaning, but rather, a practical 
and understandable meaning.  
Steinhoff’s article also furthers the importance of engaging NSAGs in IHL processes. She 
argues that through negotiations, states and armed groups can agree to apply IHL to 
conflict, in whole or in part, which in turn provides greater protections to vulnerable 
groups and captured combatants.215 Furthermore, she acknowledges the difficulty of 
carrying out such negotiations due to the fear of states that “non-violent engagement 
would legitimize the armed group”.216 States have manifested their worries through less 
regulation of internal conflicts under IHL and have traditionally argued that the bases of 
their worries are the legal consequences of bestowing legitimacy upon non-state actors.217 
Steinhoff’s argument is supported by Capie and Policzer, who argue that NSAGs must be 
addressed directly in order to hold them accountable for violations of humanitarian 
norms, but acknowledges that states are reluctant to permit this because they are “wary of 
anything that might confer legitimacy on their enemies”.218 Thus, the challenge seems 
two-folded:  1) how can one most effectively engage NSAGs in order to increase respect 
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for IHL while simultaneously 2) avoid states legitimacy concerns surrounding such 
engagement. As such, the tool discussed in this thesis may seem like a correct response to 
this two-fold challenge, because it effectively engages NSAGs without demanding 
recognition from the state that their resistance is challenging.   
 
5.3.2 The specific perspective: the Deed of Commitment   
 
Chapter three provided a few practical examples of parallel legal tools, and mentioned 
that one of the most innovative mechanisms was advanced by the humanitarian 
organization Geneva Call, who since its creation in 2000 has engaged over 60 NSAGs in 
17 countries in a landmine ban.219 The initiative was inspired by the adoption of the 
Ottawa treaty220 in 1997, and though this served as a milestone in arms regulation, it is, 
like other international treaties, developed, written and directed towards states. Geneva 
Call argues that because NSAGs cannot negotiate or become parties to international 
treaties such as the Ottawa treaty, their incentives to respect the norms of the treaty are 
limited. It is also their contention that the “mechanism provided under the Convention to 
enforce the ban - criminalization of prohibited acts - is not effective against NSAGs”.221  
In order to effectively respond to this challenge, Geneva Call developed a mechanism 
entitled the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel 
Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action, hereinafter called the DoC. The purpose of 
the DoC is to allow NSAGs, who were not including in the process leading up to the 
Ottawa Treaty, and who are not eligible to enter into the Ottawa Treaty, to explicitly 
commit to and undertake to observe its norms.222 At the time Geneva Call released its 
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2010 annual report, 41 NSAGs223 had signed the DoC, and the overall assessment shows 
that “signatories are abiding by the core prohibitions and are undertaking mine action 
activities and/or facilitating access by specialized organizations”.224 It is argued that the 
“innovate methodology [to achieve increased protection for civilians] serves as a unique 
entry point towards engagement with armed non-state actors”.225 Furthermore, the 
organization states that the DoC “provides armed non-state actors with a standard, 
universal and recognizable mechanism by which they formally pledge to respect 
humanitarian norms and are held accountable for their commitments”.226 In order to hold 
the NSAGs accountable, the DoC is countersigned by the Government of the Republic 
and Canton of Geneva, which acts as its custodian.227 Geneva Call argues that there is a 
need for engagement with NSAGs to increase respect for humanitarian norms and argues 
that: 
while NSAGs play an increased role in contemporary warfare and are 
responsible for many abuses, the State-centric nature of international law 
still poses challenges for addressing the behavior of NSAGs. First, the 
mechanisms to enforce both IHL and IHRL remain mostly focused on 
States. Second, NSAGs cannot negotiate or become parties to 
international treaties, and there is no consensus on whether they can 
contribute to the formation of international customary law. Therefore 
there is little opportunity for NSAGs to express their adherence to IHL 
and IHRL norms. NSAGs may not feel bound by rules they have not 
been involved in making, nor are allowed to sign on to.228 
 
The latter quote demonstrates how Geneva Call has recognized the need for alternative 
mechanisms to ensure greater respect and compliance for IHL and IHRL, and support 
the idea that non-compliance may come about as a result of a lack of ownership of the 
law.   
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According to Mary Foster, the prevailing opinion among those participating in the 
conference that led up to the DoC in Geneva in 2000, which included academics, 
activists, representatives of NGOs, representatives of governments and NSAGs, was that 
in the effort to ban landmines, one must address non-state as well as state use of mines. 
The DoC involves NSAGs in the effort to combat the landmine problem by allowing 
them to become parties and signatories and by providing them with an opportunity to 
contribute to the creation of humanitarian norms. As mentioned in the methodology 
chapter, interviews with NSAGs would have provided this thesis with an interesting 
dimension, but in lack thereof, I will refer to some of the statements made by 
representatives from NSAGs that have committed to the DoC. Hkun Okker, chairperson 
from the Pa’o Peoples Liberation Organization (PPLO) and the Pa’o People Liberation 
Army (PPLA) in Burma specifically stated that they were grateful to Geneva Call for 
“recognizing our small groups as having a role to play and approaching us on this 
important issue”.229 Also, the Congress of nationalities for a Federal Iran (CNFI) states 
that they recognize the DoC “as a specific mechanism enabling non-State actors to 
commit to the mine ban and as a necessary complement to the Mine Ban Treaty”.230 The 
two statements demonstrate an appreciation to Geneva Call for recognizing NSAGs as 
actors on the international arena, and illustrates how inclusion in IHL, rather than 
exclusion, is valuable to strengthen protection for those affected by armed conflict. As 
argued by Miriam Coronel Ferrer: NSAGs must be engaged because “they are part of the 
problem, and they are part of the solution”.231 
Though the latter has provided brief introduction to the DoC, and suggests that the DoC 
has been a positive contribution to the development of alternative mechanisms for 
NSAGs, it does not provide a deeper understanding of the effectiveness of the tool. In 
order to appreciate its value, one needs to go back to the issue of ownership as an 
important factor in increasing compliance. One could argue the DoC is a true practical 
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example of putting in place a genuine commitment to humanitarian norms, and what 
Bangerter has described as creating “accepted standards, instead of what is often 
considered as imposed standards”.232 From the beginning, this thesis has proposed that 
the one of the main factors impeding NSAGs from gaining greater respect for IHL is the 
state-centric nature of the IHL framework, and the lack of mechanisms that addresses the 
gap between the practical reality and the legal reality. As argued by Sassóli, to ensure that 
NSAGs comply with IHL, it is a requirement to increase their sense of ownership over 
this law.233 As mentioned several times throughout this paper, the matter of whether 
NSAGs are legally obliged to comply with IHL has been settled. However, as pointed out, 
in practice, it is always easier to obtain respect of rules by getting acceptance of that rule 
by those whom it is addressed to, “rather than by arguing in favor of sophisticated legal 
constructions”.234 In this regard, Sassóli makes a persuasive argument by referring to an 
example from El Salvador, where the FMLN would not let the ICRC evacuate wounded 
enemies because they did not consider themselves bound by AP II, unless it had 
concluded an agreement to this effect.235 Thus, the main argument furthered is that 
parallel legal agreements matter because they put in place specific commitments and 
because it has been shown that they have the ability to influence the behavior of NSAGs. 
The DoC has been widely recognized as a successful initiative, and is a true example of 
how ownership matters in practice.236  
5.4 No cure for all 
 
It was previously asserted that the concept of NSAGs is in itself extremely hard to discuss 
in a general sense, because no single definition can be ascribed to it. When trying to 
answer what constitutes a non-state armed group, one will be left with a variety of 
answers that are likely to cause more confusion than enlightenment. The complex and 
changing nature of NSAGs have led scholars and practitioners to focus their efforts on 
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trying to categorize NSAGs according to their main characteristics. Assessing the main 
characteristics of a group is particularly highlighted as an important preliminary step to 
dialogue or negotiations, as group characteristics are likely to influence the fruitfulness of 
that engagement.237 In 2006, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a manual and a set of guidelines to provide 
guidance to practitioners on how to prepare for and conduct humanitarian negotiations 
with NSAGs. It is argued that “each armed group is different”, and therefore, one must 
consider the characteristics of NSAGs in order to increase the efficiency and the desired 
outcomes of the negotiations.238  Consequently, characteristics of NSAGs is divided into 
eight separate categories: (a) motivations; (b) structure; (c) principles of action; (d) 
interests; (e) constituency; (f) needs; (g) ethno-cultural dimensions; (h) control of 
population and territory.239 The first category encourages practitioners to consider the 
original motivation for the formation, behaviour and conduct of the armed group. It is 
put forth that in terms of founding motivations, NSAGs usually fall into three categories: 
reactionary, opportunistic or ideological.240 The NSAGs motivation at the time of its formation 
may however have changed over time, and it is therefore necessary to assess the NSAGs 
current motivation. Secondly, the structure of the armed group is likely to affect 
negotiation efforts. It is argued that: “the organization’s leadership structure has 
implications for the ability to secure commitment and implementation from the 
leadership to any agreed outcome of negotiations”.241 One must also attempt to assess the 
power structure of the NSAG as well as the level of autonomy among regional/local sub-
commanders.242 Thirdly, humanitarian actors should understand the NSAGs core 
principles, their principles of action. Mc Hugh and Bessler suggest that an NSAG may be 
guided by principles of guerrilla warfare; religious, ideological, political or cultural 
principles; or purely economic objectives. Understanding and learning about these 
principles may, according to the authors, improve the likelihood of successful 
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negotiations.243 Next, it is proposed that one should have an understanding of the 
NSAGs interests, particularly because humanitarian actors may use this information to 
highlight areas of shared interest.244 Though Mc Hugh and Bessler focus on humanitarian 
negotiations in general, this particular category may perhaps be valuable for those seeking 
to improve NSAGs compliance with IHL. If negotiators are able to identify NSAGs 
interest in increasing its own legitimacy among the local population, one may perhaps be 
successful in convincing the NSAG that adherence to IHL is vital. If this interest is 
genuine, and the humanitarian actor is successful in convincing the NSAG that adherence 
to IHL may increase its legitimacy, the NSAG may be more prone to accepting its legal 
obligations. The fifth category urges humanitarian negotiators to assess whether the 
NSAG claims a legitimate constituency, and argues that many NSAGs “may profess to 
act on behalf of a particular group (…) when in many cases the group has no basis for 
claiming a mandate from the purported constituents”.245 Sixth, Mc Hugh and Bessler put 
forth that one must separate the NSAGs needs from its interests, and “be attuned to the 
potential for the existential of functional needs (e.g. financial needs) of the armed group 
to influence the negotiation strategy of the group”. The last two categories argue that 
when attempting to characterize the NSAGs, one must assess whether certain cultural, 
religious or ethnic characteristics may influence the armed groups strategy/approach, as 
well as the extent of control exerted by the armed group over a given population or 
territory.246  
Mc Hugh and Bessler manage to provide a valuable framework that rests on the notion 
that NSAGs as a whole cannot be defined, but rather, they can be differentiated 
according to their main characteristics. However, the most interesting aspect related to 
categorizing NSAGs is the idea that for IHL norms to be effectively implemented, and 
respected, certain group characteristics are indispensable. As Olivier Bangerter argues: 
“we have to recognize that some armed groups have goals that in themselves amount to 
violations of IHL, or wilfully choose to violate IHL as a part of their way of waging 
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war”.247 Though these NSAGs are interesting purely because they pursue their goals 
through tactics that are extremely brutal and violent, they are arguably not relevant within 
the framework of this thesis because they simply do not possess the characteristics 
necessary for legal instruments to work. I will now proceed to discuss this argument.  
As put forth by Bangerter, one must recognize that some NSAGs are simply not willing 
or able to adhere to IHL. He argues that where there is no genuine commitment by the 
NSAG to adhere to IHL, the application of any of the measures described in this thesis 
that constitutes as a parallel legal tool will not result in significant and sustainable 
improvement of the situation on the ground, in terms of respect of IHL.248 In following, 
one could argue that it is presupposed that for parallel legal instruments to function 
correctly, the group must not only have the capacity to comply with IHL, but also express 
their willingness to adhere to IHL for any possible reason. However, the argument that 
NSAGs can and want to comply with IHL might seem strange considering the generally 
negative perception of NSAGs conduct in civil wars. As pointed out by Bangerter, “the 
general attitude towards armed groups in Western society is quite negative and a number 
of people question their ability to respect IHL”.249 He argues that this conceptualisation 
of armed groups as violators of IHL is grounded in three claims: 1) NSAGs are by 
definition de-structured, 2) NSAGs are by trade the worst violators of IHL and 3) 
NSAGs pay no attention to IHL.250 Bangerter proceeds to refute these three claims by 
arguing that: first, to function as a group and not as a mob, an armed group needs to have 
an organisation of some kind. Lack of organisation is fatal in the face of adversaries, 
whom most armed groups are facing; and armed groups need to organise, or face quick 
destruction.251 Second, by referring to data from Uganda, Peru and Mozambique252, 
Bangerter argues that “we should simply acknowledge the fact that where reliable date 
exists, it is impossible to predict which party will commit most abuses. Any Party to a 
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non-international conflict, regardless of its legal status, can commit violations of IHL.253 
Thirdly, Bangerter asserts that “there is no fixed pattern” as to whether NSAGs pay 
attention to, or care about, IHL.254 The relevant point to be made here is the fact that 
NSAGs are not by definition sadistic, unruly and disorderly. Some may be, but others 
may not be, and it would therefore be incorrect to paint such a general picture of NSAGs, 
and assume that they are unable or unwilling to comply with IHL. Inadvertently, it is 
necessary to point out that if parallel engagement instruments are to be effective, non-
compliance with IHL must not be a result of a lack of will, but rather due to lack of 
capacity, or the belief that the rules are imposed by states and therefore not practically 
applicable. This would indicate that the issue of ownership or recognition as a party to the 
conflict becomes essential to promoting compliance. Because of the fact that some 
groups operate with strategies that are inherently in violation of IHL, group 
characteristics is obviously an important aspect of application, and therefore, it is stated in 
AP II, article 1(1) that the protocol shall apply to:  
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under  
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as  
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations 
and to implement this Protocol.255 
 
As demonstrated earlier, the elements of territorial control and group structure is also 
highlighted in the OCHA manual. In terms of group structure, the element of command 
structure is particularly important because it indicates that combatants are inclined to 
follow instructions from superiors. Claude Bruderlein argues that “a basic command 
structure”, is one of the minimal organizational standards that would make contact 
worthwhile. NSAGs with a basic command structure have combatants that “are 
organized according to a unitary command structure and follow its instructions. The 
commanders have at least a minimum control over the conduct of their combatants, 
particularly regarding the group’s behaviour towards civilians”.256 Furthermore, 
Bruderlein argues that any “dialogue on humanitarian issues with fragmented groups and 
groups with strong internal dissension are likely to be unproductive, if not 
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counterproductive”.257 One could argue that a NSAG with basic command structure is an 
easier target in terms of promoting compliance with IHL through parallel legal tools 
because commitments made by the leadership would influence the groups as a whole. If 
one manages to secure genuine commitment to such agreements from the military 
commanders or political leadership, there is a higher probability that this commitment will 
be transferred onto the combatants, both in terms of acceptance and enforcement. In 
addition to having a basic command structure, Bruderlein argues that the second main 
characteristic is “the use of violence to achieve political ends”. In this context, violence is 
“often employed not as a military tactic aiming for a takeover, but as a means to render 
the political status quo unsustainable”. The violence may take different forms, however, 
the “extent to which combatants are allowed to engage in independent criminal activities 
indicates how well a group’s leader control it”.258 The third main characteristic, according 
to Bruderlein, is “independence from state control”. It is argued that the issue of state 
control is problematic, because in many situations it is difficult to distinguish between 
autonomous pro-government forces, such as paramilitary groups in Colombia, and 
government-controlled paramilitary forces, such as the South Lebanese Army in Israeli-
occupied Lebanon. However, as with the latter, “the degree of the leader’s control over 
the conduct of combatants remains an important indicator of the independence of the 
group”.259 Bruderlein argues that practitioners generally encourage caution with groups 
whose characteristics fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria. The 
NSAGs that fail to meet the basic command structure criteria, such as irregular and 
disorganized combatants, criminal gangs, bandits and looters, are according to Bruderlein 
“unlikely to engage constructively in a dialogue on humanitarian issues”.260 Thus, it can be 
argued that possession of group characteristics such as command structure, organisation 
and territorial control, would increase the potential of parallel legal tools.    
As stated previously, Simmons argues that treaties have significant effects, but they do not 
have the same effects everywhere. In following, it is argued that neither stable 
democracies, nor stable autocracies are likely compliers as a result of legal agreements. 
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Simply put, Simmons argues that the effect of legal agreements is dependent on the type 
of state, and the characteristics of this state. Due to the large number of states, and the 
large variety between them, Simmons has concluded that it is impossible to make any 
definite conclusions on whether legal agreements concerning IHRL have a positive, or 
negative effect on states, because it is so largely dependent on what type of state we are 
dealing with. In chapter three, it was put forth that the concept of NSAGs is inherently 
complex, and in the latter section, I have argued that group characteristics influence the 
fruitfulness of engagement. Though a direct transfer of Simmons typologies to NSAGs is 
arguably difficult, it is the underlying reasoning of Simmons typology, the idea that is 
matters for some but not all, that is useful in a study of NSAGs and parallel agreements.  
By using Simmon’s framework, one can ask several questions related to NSAGs and IHL, 
firstly, who are possible committers and secondly, what NSAGs are potential compliers? 
Though it may be a far stretch to argue that some NSAGs are “stable democracies” in the 
same manner as those referred to by Simmons, it is a fair argument that many NSAGs 
that operate at present are “stable autocracies”, because they use techniques and strategies 
that are extremely brutal and inconsistent with both IHRL and IHL. This is especially true 
for groups that pursue genocidal aims and also for groups that use violations of IHRL or 
IHL to pursue their goals. The deliberate killing of civilians through attacks on buildings 
or areas where non-combatants are located is an indication that the NSAG in question is 
perhaps not approachable on matters related to IHL. This does not automatically suggest 
that these NSAGs are unable to change their conduct, and therefore, appealing to 
commitment would fail. Rather, it suggests that such efforts would require a slower 
process of strategic argumentation, because the NSAG in question is not already 
convinced that compliance with humanitarian norms is constructive. As Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui suggest, treaties have failed to change the world’s worst abusers.261 The same 
could arguably be true with NSAGs, as those that are characterised as violent, oppressive 
and de-structured are perhaps similar to these states, because the end result would be the 
same regardless of whether a legal agreement was in place or not. With these states, or 
with these NSAGs, as perhaps appropriately described by Bruderlein as “mafia-like 
militias”, legal agreements would most likely fail to make a difference. With these NSAGs, 
                                                
261 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, op. cit., p. 421 
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as with Simmons “stable autocracies”, one could argue that legal agreements are largely 
redundant and irrelevant, because non-compliance with IHL is due to a lack of will, rather 
than a lack of capacity or ability. However, by establishing what NSAGs are not likely 
committers, nor compliers, we are left with a large number of groups who fall into 
Simmons “middle category”. When using Simmons theory, it is important to revisit one 
of the points made in this section, namely the fact that most practitioners agree that the 
main characteristics of armed groups should be identified prior to engagement. As I have 
pointed out, Bruderlein argues that an assessment of the NSAGs main characteristics is 
an important preliminary step to dialogue or negotiations, because these are likely to 
influence the fruitfulness of that engagement. Simmons three types can therefore be 
compared to the way scholars and practitioners dealing with NSAGs use group 
characteristics to determine whether engagement efforts are thought to be successful or 
not. For practitioners dealing with NSAGs, a genuine commitment, and a willingness to 
adhere to IHL is extremely important. Also, to refer to AP II, for IHL to apply it is 
essential that we are dealing with an organized armed group, who is under responsible 
command and who exercises control over territory. One group that would arguably fall 
outside of this categorization is Al-Qaeda. For Simmons, neither stable democracies, nor 
stable autocracies, have the right characteristics to be greatly influenced by legal 
agreements on human rights. For those promoting engagement with NSAGs through 
parallel legal tools, neither disorganized militia-groups, nor groups that use violations of 
IHL as a part of their strategy, have the right characteristics to be greatly influenced by 
parallel agreements on IHL. Based upon the research conducted within the field of IHRL, 
and the empirical accounts from research on NSAGs and IHL, it can be argued that the 
effectiveness of legal agreements are largely dependent on the characteristics of the 
ratifier. This suggestion is valid for both state, and non-state actors. As such, it must be 
emphasized that considering the different characteristics of NSAGs operating at current, 
this thesis does not suggest a universal solution that may potentially lead all NSAGs to 
comply with IHL. To get a clearer idea of the line of reasoning put forth in the latter 
section a summary is presented on the subsequent page.  
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Potential committers  Unlikely committers 
Dependent on domestic or international 
support: the NSAGs is convinced that 
commitment to the agreement is necessary for 
strategic reasons. Dependence on domestic 
support may indicate that the NSAG has some 
form of territorial control. 
Not reliant on international public opinion, such 
as the Taliban. The NSAG is not convinced that 
commitment to the agreement is necessary for 
strategic reasons OR the NSAG lacks territorial 
control, is decentralized or consists of fragmented 
groups, or cells, like Al Qaeda. 
The leadership promotes and supports 
compliance with IHL. 
The leadership promotes and supports violations 
of IHL. 
Violations of IHL are due to lack of capacity 
OR due to lack of ownership of the law. 
Violations of IHL are a deliberate strategy OR 
violations of IHL are due to lack of capacity. 
The NSAG values the short-term benefits 
from committing to the agreement, and wants 
to avoid the scrutiny from not committing. 
The NSAG sees no short-term benefits from 
committing to the agreement, and does not care 
about external pressure to commit. 
Potential compliers Unlikely compliers 
The NSAG has territorial control over an area 
and is dependent on support from their 
constituency.  
The NSAG lacks territorial control, is 
decentralized or consists of fragmented groups, or 
cells, like Al Qaeda. 
Strong degree of command control: soldiers 
follow instructions from the leadership, and 
are instructed and trained to behave in 
accordance with IHL.  
Weak degree of command control: soldiers do not 
follow instructions from leadership and IHL is 
not translated from the leadership to the 
combatants.  
Compliance with IHL is viewed as necessary in 
the struggle against the state, and the content 
of the agreement is consistent with their 
interests.  
Violations of IHL is a deliberate strategy (ethnic 
cleansing etc.) OR violations of IHL are due to 
lack of capacity. 
The leadership sanctions violations. The leadership does deliberately not sanction 
violations OR the group lacks the capacity to 
sanction violations. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze whether, and how, parallel legal tools can 
contribute to increasing NSAGs compliance with IHL. The initial parts of this study highlighted 
how the changing nature of warfare has brought fort a number of challenges to the 
framework of IHL. It was argued that while the international laws guiding conduct in war 
remains state-centered, the practical reality is less and less centered on the state. 
Subsequently, it was put forth that enhancing NSAGs compliance with IHL is viewed as 
one of the core challenges to strengthen protection of civilians in armed conflict. It was 
argued that in order to effectively deal with these challenges, NSAGs have to be 
addressed and engaged directly. A variety of available engagement tools were explored, 
and it was suggested that one of the most innovative tools in the contemporary toolbox is 
the use of parallel legal agreements on IHL.  
Based on research conducted within the field of IHRL, it has been shown that 
commitment to agreements occurs for a variety of reasons, and that commitment does 
not necessarily ensure compliance with that agreement. It can be argued that commitment 
and compliance theory from IHRL is not directly transferrable to NSAGs and IHL, 
however, the general reasoning on treaty commitment and compliance provide some 
insight and guidance. In particular, the observation from IHRL research that the 
effectiveness of legal agreements is dependent upon the characteristics of the ratifier was 
also found in observations from research on NSAGs. Thus, it can be concluded that 
though legality matters for some, it does not matter for all. As such, it has not been 
argued that signed agreements by NSAGs automatically generate compliance, but rather, 
that deviation from the content can occur because the genuine committer has a lack of 
capacity, or because the disingenuous committer has a lack of will. Furthermore, parallel 
legal agreements arguably contribute to increasing NSAGs compliance with IHL because 
through explicit commitment, theoretical obligations can be transformed into accepted, 
and solid obligations. The successful example set by Geneva Call through the DoC shows 
that the value of parallel legal tools is not just an idea, but also, a practical reality.  
79 
 
As the analysis has illustrated, the potential of engagement efforts through parallel legal 
tools is enhanced by certain group characteristics. Dependence on domestic or 
international support, genuine support of IHL norms from the leadership, the belief that 
one is not bound by IHL unless one has concluded an agreement to that affect, or simply, 
a realization that the short-term benefits from committing to an agreement is valuable, are 
all reasons for why NSAGs would commit to a parallel legal agreement on IHL. 
However, as this thesis demonstrated, group characteristics such as the level of territorial 
control, the ability of the leadership to control, instruct and train their soldier to behave in 
accordance with the agreement, the belief that the content of the agreement is consistent 
with their interest and goals, and the use of sanctions are all factors that can bring about 
compliance. As such, it is argued that considering the different characteristics of NSAGs, 
this thesis does not suggest a universal solution that may potentially lead all NSAGs to 
comply with IHL. Thus, it can be argued that practitioners seeking to engage NSAGs in 
parallel legal agreements must be wary of how the tools constructiveness is influenced by 
the characteristics of the recipient.  
As mentioned, increasing state and non-state actors compliance with IHL is important to 
strengthen protection for those taking part in hostilities, as well as civilians affected by 
conflict. The legal challenges in terms of how to deal with NSAGs using IHL has 
practical consequences, and further research should continue to explore alternative 
mechanisms that can increase NSAGs compliance with IHL. As argued, experience has 
shown that engagement efforts with NSAGs are effective in confronting this challenge, 
and continued efforts to include NSAGs in the realm of IHL is encouraged. 
It was put forth that research on IHRL has shown that treaties have failed to change the 
world’s worst abusers, and furthermore, that those researching NSAGs and IHL have 
reinforced this observation by encouraging caution with extremely violent groups on the 
basis that engagement is likely to be unproductive. However, further research should 
continue to explore whether other mechanisms have the ability to change the worst 
abusers, and in particular, whether NSAGs that fall into this category are susceptive to 
any measures. If previous efforts to strengthen compliance with IHL have been made, an 
in-depth case study of one of these groups could explore why this particular effort failed, 
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and theorize whether the NSAGs characteristics were decisive in bringing about failure, 
or whether other factors played a larger role. Furthermore, as the DoC is categorized as a 
successful initiative it would be interesting to conduct a more thorough analysis of the 
NSAGs that have committed to this agreement. More specifically, a comprehensive 
analysis of the NSAGs that have committed, and subsequently complied with the DoC 
could contribute to the debate on group characteristics and reveal whether a detectable 
pattern is present.  
Ultimately, this thesis does not suggest that parallel legal tools have the potential to end all 
violations of IHL committed by NSAGs. What it suggests, however, is that parallel legal 
tools do have the ability to strengthen compliance with IHL for NSAGs that inhabit 
certain characteristics. While this is not ideal, it would be a chimera that increased 
compliance with IHL by NSAGs could be achieved through a universal solution. In sum, 
it is argued that engagement efforts through parallel legal tools have practical utility 
because they address the gap between the practical reality and the legal reality.  
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